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We propose a dynamic non-cooperative framework for long-term-care (LTC) decisions of families
and use it to evaluate LTC policy options for the U.S. We firs document the importance of informal
caregiving and economic determinants of care arrangements.We then build a heterogeneous-agents model
with imperfectly-altruistic overlapping generations to account for the patterns we find A key innovation
is the availability of informal care (IC), which is determined through intra-family bargaining. This opens
up a new margin in response to policy and allows for informal insurance through home-production of
care. Our calibrated model captures the observed care arrangements well. We study the implications of
non-means-tested IC and formal care (FC) subsidies as well as changes to means-tested Medicaid. We
fin that IC responds strongly to these policies. An IC subsidy substantially reduces reliance on Medicaid,
while the reduction of tax revenues due to lower labour supply by caregivers is modest. There are large
welfare gains from a combination of IC and FC subsidies, even when combined with a reduction of the
Medicaid program.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Atwenty-first-centur challenge to governments is to fin ways to deal with a growing number of
elderly citizens in need of care. In Germany and Japan, for example, governments have already
stepped in; both countries have universal long-term-care (LTC) insurance for the elderly.1 In the
U.S., the Affordable Care Act signed into law in 2010 contained legislation on a market-based
1. The gerontological literature define the need for LTC as becoming dependent on assistance from another person
due to functional limitations, such as having difficultie with activities of daily living (ADL) (e.g. getting in and out of
bed, getting dressed, and eating) or with instrumental activities of daily living (IADL) (e.g. buying groceries, preparing
meals).
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LTC policy, which subsequently failed. This led to renewed debates on LTC policy options.
In a recent report to congress, the bipartisan Commision on Long-Term Care (2013) forcefully
defends the importance of family-caregivers and the need to enable the elderly to stay at home,
shifting attention away from private LTC insurance.2 Debates about LTC reform are bound to
intensify as the ratio of elderly who require LTC to the working-age population is projected to
increase, and nursing-home (NH) prices continue to grow rapidly.3
We argue that the evaluation of LTC policy has to take seriously the response of the family.
After all, in the U.S. and elsewhere, the family constitutes a very important source of care. For
example, subsidies for nursing-home care (NHC) may merely crowd out informal care (IC),
thus providing little additional insurance at a high cost to the government. On the other hand,
subsidizing NHs may be less costly than its face value since it allows family caregivers to stay in
the labour force and pay taxes.An alternative measure, subsidies to IC, may be expensive if many
informal caregivers leave their jobs (e.g. working-age children), or simply ineffective if it goes
primarily to infra-marginal caregivers (i.e. to caregivers who would provide care irrespectively
of the subsidy, such as retired spouses). On the positive side, encouraging IC could help to keep
Medicaid spending in check.
We see our main contributions as the following. First, we document the importance of family-
provided care and study its economic correlates and the compensation of caregivers in the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS). Second, we build a fully-dynamic non-cooperative model
of two interacting generations. An innovation with respect to the literature is that there are both
altruistically-motivated and exchange-motivated transfers in the model. The model gives rise to a
wide range of care arrangements and their financing which we characterize. Third, we calibrate
the model, using a quantitatively realistic life cycle, family, and risk structure, and analyse a set
of policy reforms. With respect to the macroeconomic old-age-risks literature, our innovation is
that we take into account the family margin when it comes to the response to LTC policies, and
that we show that this margin matters quantitatively.
Using the HRS, we fin that almost two-thirds of all hours of care are provided informally,
particularly by retired spouses and working-age children. The remaining one-third of care hours
comes from formal sources, primarily NH (formal home care (FHC) playing a more minor role).4
We fin that children’s opportunity costs in the labour market and parental wealth (typically
housing) matter significantl in the determination of care arrangements.5 We also fin that, both
within and across families, caregiving children receive higher transfers (especially in the form of
co-residence, but also by being signed over home ownership during the parent’s lifetime). These
facts strongly hint at an intra-family bargaining channel in the care decision.6
2. Also most other countries that have undertaken LTC reforms have shied away from market-based solutions.
They have instead opted for universal insurance schemes, as opposed to the means-tested Medicaid program in the U.S.,
see Gleckman (2010).
3. The dependency ratio is projected to increase from 6.4% in 2010 to 7.4% in 2020, and to 9.6% in 2030, see
Johnson et al. (2007). Stewart et al. (2009) document that annual private-payer (PP) NH prices grew by 7.5% annually
from $8,645 in 1977 to $60,249 in 2004. Medicaid reimbursement rates grew by 6.7% annually from $9,491 in 1979 to
$48,056 in 2004.
4. See also Stoller and Martin (2002); Wolff and Kasper (2006); etc.
5. Our finding here are in linewith the literature. Garber and MaCurdy (1990) show that owning a home decreases
the probability of going to a NH. Headen (1993) find that wealth significantl reduces the hazard of NH entry and that
NH entry is positively related to opportunity costs of informal caregivers in the family.
6. See also,Bernheim et al. (1985),who argues that parents strategicallywithhold resources to “purchase” attention
from their children with a larger bequest. Cox and Rank (1992) fin evidence that parents exchange gifts for services from
their children. Boersch-Supan et al. (1992) fin that those with higher incomes are less likely to go to a NH, possibly
because they use it to make transfer payments to children. Norton and Houtven (2006) and Norton et al. (2013) fin
2
To capture these facts, we write down a dynamic heterogeneous-agents model with
overlapping generations. Parents and children make separate, non-cooperative savings decisions
and lack commitment. Separate savings decisions are crucial to evaluate LTC policy. For the
elderly, savings are a key source of insurance. Children tend to be in their prime saving years
when facing the decision if to give care to a frail parent or not, and so their expectations about
bequests from the parent are crucial. Also, the Medicaid means test explicitly conditions on the
elderly household’s wealth and not on that of the extended family.7 We model the provision of IC
by intra-family bargaining. In each period, parent and child bargain; if they agree on IC, a financia
transfer may flo in exchange for a time transfer (care). However, households are also altruistic
towards each other. They take into account the other’s economic situation and preferences in the
bargaining process and can make transfers that are purely altruistic in nature (gifts). As a result,
our setting gives rise to a host of care arrangements. The child may provide IC (1) in exchange for
immediate transfers, (2) without contemporaneous compensation but in anticipation of a higher
bequest, or (3) out of pure altruism, receiving neither transfers nor a bequest. Formal care may
be (1) paid by the parent alone, (2) subsidized by transfers from the child to varying degrees, or
(3) paid for by Medicaid. The model captures care and transfer arrangements well, but produces
too little altruistic care compared to the data.
We calibrate our model to the U.S. economy and use it to evaluate several policy options. We
firs consider non-means-tested subsidies for informal and formal care. We base the amounts of
these subsidies on Germany’s LTC reform. Germany provides universal (i.e. non-means-tested)
subsidies for both informal and formal caregiving, where the subsidy for informal caregiving
is less generous than the one for institutionalized care. We also study how a reduction in the
size of the current Medicaid program in conjunction with the introduction of these subsidies
affects the economy. In our setting, policy affects welfare through four channels. It (1) alters pre-
existing labour-supply distortions induced by the tax system (labour-wedge channel), (2) provides
insurance (insurance channel), (3) influence the use of means-tested Medicaid (Medicaid
channel), and (4) helps to overcome within-family commitment problems (family-commitment
channel). The formal-care subsidy, but not the informal-care subsidy, is welfare-improving
through the labour-wedge channel. However, the informal-care subsidy is superior in the other
three channels since it is better at targeting disadvantaged families for which these channels are
particularly relevant.
We fin that a non-means-tested informal-care subsidy is partly self-financin since it strongly
decreases reliance on Medicaid. On the fli side, it has the cost that it reduces labour supply as
individuals temporarily exit the labour force to provide care; but this cost is relatively small as
primarily individuals of lower productivity respond. Overall, the informal-care subsidy provides
sizeable welfare gains in both the short and long run.Anon-means-tested subsidy to PP of formal
care (FC) is more expensive and less popular as it benefit primarily richer families.We fin that a
combination of the two subsidies (for formal and informal care) creates large welfare gains; such
a combination retains the advantages from either subsidy: low-income elderly make use of IC,
instead of undesirable and costly Medicaid. High-income elderly come to rely more on PP care
instead of IC, which brings more productive children back into the labour force. Interestingly,
evidence for such an exchange specificall for caregiving; Brown (2006) and Groneck (2017) fin empirical evidence
that caregiving children obtain larger bequests than their non-caregiving siblings. Johnson and Sasso (2006) also fin
evidence consistent with bargaining.
7. Note that in cooperative models of the family (with commitment), the evolution of the distribution of wealth
between family members as well as the timing of financia transfers is indeterminate. This implies that in the presence
of a Medicaid means test, it is a dominant strategy for the family to leave all wealth in hands of the child. But this is not
what is observed in reality (parents tend to cling to their wealth until death), nor is it legal for parents to circumvent the
means test by such a transfer. In our model, parents endogenously stick to their wealth for strategic reasons.
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this policy option remains popular across all population groups even if it is paired with a cut to
the size of the Medicaid program.
Our article is most directly related to a macroeconomic literature that is concerned with the
evaluation of government insurance policies for the elderly, such as Medicaid and Medicare
(e.g. Attanasio et al., 2011; Braun et al., 2017; and DeNardi et al., 2013). Our results indicate
that these papers miss a key margin by neglecting the role of the family. For example, we fin
that in the long run a Medicaid expansion drives twice as many people from IC into Medicaid
than from PP NH. A model without family only captures the shift of PP into Medicaid and thus
vastly underestimates the cost increases in the Medicaid program. The presence of the family
also matters for welfare implications of policies. For example, we fin that a cut to Medicaid is
partially offset within the family through additional IC and financia help from children.Amodel
without family leaves individuals with fewer margins of adjustment and thus likely overstates
welfare losses. Finally, our model opens up the possibility to evaluate a wider range of policies,
such as informal-care subsidies, than considered by the previous literature.
We combine elements from this macroeconomic literature with those from an applied
microeconomic literature, which is explicitly concerned with the role of the family in providing
care. Pauly (1990) argues that if parents prefer to obtain care from their children over FC,
individuals would strategically abstain from buying private LTC insurance to induce caregiving
from children, even at actuarilly fair prices.8 Byrne et al. (2009) estimate a static model that
captures the interaction between parents and multiple children in the choice between FHC and
IC, leaving aside NHC. We fin stronger reactions to care subsidies than they do, most likely
because our model includes Medicaid-finance NHs as an alternative for poor families. These are
exactly the families that react most to financia incentives in our model. The estimation exercises
of Van Houtven et al. (2013) and Skira (2015) show that the opportunity costs of caregiving play
a crucial role in the caregiving decision, in line with our results.
In a wider sense, our article relates to a macroeconomic literature on old-age risks and savings
behaviour. This literature has identifie uncertain medical expenditure as a prime candidate
to explain why wealthy elderly Americans dissave at a rate that is slower than standard life-
cycle models would predict. Palumbo (1999) and DeNardi et al. (2010) show that augmenting
a standard model with medical expenditures can solve the puzzle. Kopecky and Koreshkova
(2014) zero in on NH expenditure risk and fin it to be an important determinant of precautionary
savings. In contrast to these papers, elderly in our framework have access to family insurance,
thus NH expenditures are discretionary. Although our model generates large and persistent LTC
expenditures in line with the data, retired household in our model dissave faster than in reality.
This article is also part of another literature that asks if the government should intervene in
markets for services that can be produced both within the family and by the market. In contrast
to us, the literature on child care typically find that subsidies for family care harm welfare.
Domeij and Klein (2013), for example, provide a rationale why day care for children should
be subsidized: In the presence of distortionary taxes on labour, subsidizing family-provided
child care magnifie labour-supply distortions, whereas day-care subsidies attenuate them (the
labour-wedge channel in our model). Bick (2016) also find negative aggregate welfare effects
of family-child-care subsidies. Erosa et al. (2010) study the effects of parental-leave policies in
a model with search frictions and job-specifi human capital. They fin negative welfare effects
8. According to our calibrated model, the elderly indeed have a preference for IC, which would give a role to
this channel. We do not model private LTC insurance, however, since it is not used much. Only 14% of the elderly have
a private policy (Brown and Finkelstein, 2011), and only 4% of all LTC expenditures are paid for by private insurance
(CBO, 2004). It remains a puzzle of why in the U.S. private LTC insurance is so unpopular even though it apparently is
such a large financia risk.
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of policies that encourage parental leave, primarily because subsidies distort the leave decision
(similar to our labour-wedge effect) and distributive effects (our insurance effect) are not able
to counter it. Our result that subsidizing IC is a good idea is directly opposed to this child-care
literature. This is because (1) there are two channels (Medicaid and family-commitment) that are
absent in the child-care context, and (2) the insurance channel is quantitatively stronger since
elderly care is more expensive.
In Barczyk and Kredler (2014a, 2014b), we study the timing of altruistically-motivated
transfers in a dynamic setting without commitment. In the current article, we include a time
transfer (IC) alongside financia transfers. The substantial modelling innovation here is that
this transfer is determined by intra-family bargaining. This gives rise to exchange-motivated
transfers alongside altruistically-motivated transfers (gifts). To the best of our knowledge, we
are the firs to study a dynamic model that includes both of these commonly-used transfer
motives. Also, the overlapping-generations structure gives rise to the possibility that children
give care in anticipation of a future bequest, despite an absence of explicit contracts governing
this exchange.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the institutional setting
in the U.S. and presents our empirical results. Section 3 introduces the model and characterizes its
predictions. Section 4 describes the calibration procedure, Section 5 presents the policy analysis,
and Section 6 concludes.
2. EMPIRICAL FACTS ON LTC
We firs provide a brief background on the U.S. NH sector. We then document facts about care
arrangements, caregivers, determinants of IC, and transfers that informal caregivers receive. We
refer the reader to Section 1 in the Online Appendix for details on our empirical work.
2.1. How does the U.S. NH sector work?
Nursing-home residents in the U.S. pay for care mainly out-of-pocket or by qualifying for means-
testedMedicaid. Private LTC insurance is limited, paying for about 4%ofNHexpenditures (CBO,
2004). Medicaid is the dominant purchaser of NH services, accounting for at least 50% of all
revenues of NHs (Grabowski et al., 2008). Medicare only covers stays up to 100 days following
a hospital stay, and thus accounts for only about 11% of NHs’ revenues (Norton and Newhouse,
1994).
In principle, any nursing home can admit Medicaid-finance payers, but does not have to.
Doing so requires government certificatio forMedicaid andMedicare residents, this certificatio
being basically universal (Grabowski et al., 2008). Private-paying residents are charged the price
set by the nursing home; NHs compete freely for these PPs. Individual states set Medicaid
per-diem reimbursement rates, which are typically 10–30% below the PP price (Norton, 2000;
Stewart et al., 2009). Thus it is unsurprising that NHs preferentially admit PPs (see, e.g. Ettner,
1993). To qualify for Medicaid, an individual must contribute all assets in excess of $2,000,
subject to a homestead exemption, and all monthly income. Medicaid only covers the most basic
necessities (room, board, and nursing care), leading to a lower quality of life, and so individuals
have been found to be averse of becoming reliant on it (Ameriks et al., 2011). Medicaid is the only
safety net available for LTC in the U.S.; there is neither an informal-care subsidy nor a universal
(i.e. non-means-tested) formal-care subsidy.
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TABLE 1
Care arrangements
Case counts
Community NH
Sample IC FHC IC+FHC Total MA PP Total
Care sample 72.0% 4.4% 10.4% 86.7% 8.3% 5.0% 13.3%
AHEAD singles 45.3% 7.5% 16.2% 69.0% 18.1% 12.9% 31.0%
Data source: HRS waves 2000–2010. Care sample includes individuals who receive help due to functional limitations.
AHEAD singles are those in the care sample born prior to 1924 (HRS’s AHEAD cohort). Table shows: fractions of
individuals living in community who receive exclusively IC, FHC, or a mix of IC and FHC; fractions of NH residents
who are MA-supported and PP. Fractions of NH coverage, i.e. MA or PP, based on individuals with NH stays of at least
100 days to exclude Medicare cases. An individual is classifie as Medicaid-supported if Medicaid is claimed, and NH
expenditures are either fully, mostly, or partially covered. Table 9 in the OnlineAppendix provides an overview of nursing
home expenditures by Medicaid recipiency and coverage. Respondent-level weights are used.
Hours (out of all hours)
Sample IC FHC NH
Care sample 63.5% 9.8% 26.7%
AHEAD singles 42.8% 13.3% 43.9%
Data source: HRS waves 2000–2010. Fractions out of all hours of care contributed by IC, FHC, and NH. In all 32.1
million annual total hours (unweighted) in care sample. In all, 11.3 million annual total hours inAHEAD singles sample.
Respondent-level weights are used.
2.2. How frequent are the different LTC arrangements?
We use the HRS to document facts about LTC in the U.S. The HRS is representative of the
U.S. population of age 50 years and above. It contains specifi information about a respondent’s
functional limitations with regards to ADL and IADL, about the identity of the caregiver(s),
and on hours of care each helper provides.9 We construct a sample (the care sample) that
includes all individuals who receive help due to functional limitations. We differentiate between
an individual’s residency: community, that is at home, or NH; the type of care provision for
community residents: IC, FHC, or a mix of IC and FHC; and whether NH residents are PPs or
Medicaid (MA)-supported.
Table 1 shows that the vast majority of respondents in our care sample live in the community.
When living in the community, IC is most common. Few individuals rely solely on FHC, while
a mix of FHC and IC is somewhat more common. Only 13.3% reside in a nursing home, about
62.5% of such individuals being supported by Medicaid.10
The care sample contains also relatively young individuals (the average age is 73 years).
Thus, it includes many individuals with minor care needs and relatively good opportunities to
obtain care from family members (48.9% are partnered). As a result, one may argue that this
sample overstates the importance of IC. To address this concern we consider an older and single
segment of the population, the AHEAD singles sample. Here, we restrict the care sample to
include only widow(er)s/singles who are born prior to 1924. Among them, the average age is
9. TheHRSdoes not collect hours of care forNH respondents.We assign one dummy-helper to each such individual
and impute care hours from a regression of care hours on (I)ADLs, dementia, and other controls for individuals living in
the community.
10. Medicaid coverage is similar to that reported by Grabowski et al. (2008). They use data of all nursing home
residents from seven states obtained from the Minimum Data Set for NHs and fin that the Medicaid recipiency rate is
64%, PPs make up 32%, and other type of payers account for 4%.
6
88 years. Nonetheless, as shown in Table 1, more than two-thirds among this group still lives in
the community, with IC as the dominant source of care; the importance of FHC increases but is
nowhere near that of IC. The importance of NH rises substantially, but stays at around one-third
of all cases. The MA-recipiency rate among these NH residents is 58.5%.
However, even among the oldest individuals there is still large variation in the severity of
care needs, and it is to be expected that the most severe cases end up in NHs, whereas less severe
cases are being taken care of informally. To account for the intensity of care, the second part
of Table 1 shows the percentage of total hours of care contributed by different forms of care.
Indeed, FC increases in significance but IC still keeps its dominant role. Almost two-thirds of
all hours of care are provided informally in the care sample. Within FC, NHs provide about three
times as many hours as FHC. Among the oldest-old widow(ers)/singles, IC hours continue to be
substantial and are in the ballpark of care provided in NHs.
2.3. Who provides care, and how much?
Wenowaskwho the informal caregivers are.We split informal helpers into two groups, depending
on whether they face opportunity costs in the labour market or not. Helpers in retirement age are
define as old (these are most often spouses), and those of working-age are define as young
(these are typically children of the disabled).We also create a residual informal-caregiver category
(other) for helpers who are relatives or friends, but for whom the HRS does not provide their age.
We defin three care-intensity categories: weekly hours of care of <7.5 is light, 7.5-19 weekly
hours is medium, and heavy stands for at least 20 weekly hours (equivalent to a part-time job or
more).We classify care hours that FHC andNHhelpers provide into the same intensity categories.
We defin a respondent as disabled when (s)he receives 90 or more monthly hours of care.11
Table 2 shows the joint distribution of care intensity and helper type, both for helper counts and
for hours. The majority of all helpers provide care of light intensity, most of them being young.
Among heavy helpers, young, old, and NH helpers are about equally common. Heavy helpers
make up about one-third of all helpers, but provide the lion’s share of all hours of care. This
indicates that caregiving is heavily concentrated on some helpers. Consistent with this notion,
we fin that disabled elderly living in the community receive care most commonly from exactly
one heavy helper.12 The lower part of Table 2 is restricted to disabled individuals — they obtain
the lion’s share of all hours of care — and shows the fractions of care hours provided by the
helper types depending on the respondent’s partnership status. We see that old IC helpers are
critical when the respondent is married/coupled. For widow(ers)/singles the young and NHs play
a central role and are of similar importance.
From the perspective of children, we fin that care is usually concentrated on one child. In
families with multiple children and at least one heavy-helper child, it is most often exactly one
child who takes on this role (86.2%). When considering characteristics of kid heavy-helpers
we fin that they are middle-aged (average age is 48 years); predominantly female (74%); are
11. We use imputed hours for NH residents, which implies that most (90.3%) but not all NH residents are
counted as disabled. Our definitio of disability corresponds exactly to disability levels (Pflegestufen) II and above
in the German LTC insurance system. To be declared level II (severe disability), a person must be in need of at least
3 h of care daily (90 h monthly), see the German health ministry’s website, http://www.bmg.bund.de/themen/pflege
pflegebeduerftigkeit/pflegestufen.ht .
12. To be precise, among disabled married/coupled individuals, 3.7% have no heavy helper, 83.7% have exactly
one heavy helper, 10.3% have two, and 2.3% have three or more. Among disabled widow(ers)/singles living at home,
10.5% have no heavy-helper, 69.2% have exactly one heavy helper, 16.0% have two, and 4.3% have three or more heavy
helpers.
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TABLE 2
Who provides care, and how much?
No. of cases (out of all helpers) Hours (out of all hours)
Helper type Light Medium Heavy Light Medium Heavy
Young 28.6% 5.7% 9.1% 3.3% 3.3% 23.1%
Old 13.8% 3.1% 9.4% 1.9% 1.9% 25.3%
Other 8.0% 1.1% 1.4% 0.7% 0.6% 3.3%
FHC 4.6% 1.9% 3.7% 0.7% 1.1% 8.0%
NH 0.6% 0.6% 8.5% 0.0% 0.4% 26.3%
total 55.6% 12.4% 32.1% 6.6% 7.3% 86.0%
Data source:HRSwaves 2000–2010. Joint distribution of care intensity and caregiver type in care sample.Helper-intensity
categories light, medium, and heavy, correspond to <7.5, 7.5–19, and >19 weekly care hours, respectively.
Hours (out of all hours) among disabled
Partner status Old Young Other FHC NH
Married/coupled 64.7% 14.6% 1.3% 5.9% 13.5%
Widow(er)/single 1.9% 40.4% 6.5% 12.4% 38.8%
Any 28.4% 29.5% 4.3% 9.7% 28.1%
Data source: HRS waves 2000–2010. Care sample restricted to individuals receiving monthly hours of care of at least 90
hours (disabled individuals). Partner status is of respondent. Table shows fractions of hours disabled respondent receives
from helper types conditional on partnership status.
less often full-time employed (38.4%, versus 64.7% among all young in our sample); and less
educated (17.9% have a college degree, versus 24.1% among all young).13
2.4. Which families opt for IC?
We have seen that IC is predominant among disabled individuals who are married. It is reasonable
to expect that this arrangement is not very responsive to policy changes, as care among spouses
usually takes place automatically. However, for disabled widow(ers)/singles, children and NHs
are the main sources of care, and we would expect care arrangements to be more responsive to
policies among this group. But what explains that in some families IC takes place while it does
not in others?
To gain an understanding we estimate a linear probability model for the IC choice depending
on covariates drawn from both the parent and child households. The results are shown in Table 3
(for children, a characteristic is that of the average across all children of the care recipient).14
The firs column shows that the presence of a spouse/partner is a key predictor of IC, even after
controlling for a variety of other characteristics. For all other covariates, their coefficient are
quite robust across all specification (we restrict the sample to singles in the second column and
further to disabled singles in the third column). The number of children has a significan positive
impact on the likelihood of IC. But the effect is small compared to the large negative effect that
children’s education has, indicating that children’s opportunity costs in the labour market are the
13. The Online Appendix provides further statistics on heavy-helper children and care recipients.
14. The dependent variable is whether or not IC takes place. An individual who receives a mix of FHC and IC is
counted as a formal-care recipient if the majority of hours of care is due to FHC; vice versa, if the majority of hours stem
from IC we count the individual as an IC recipient. We also considered other specification than that shown in the table,
such as logits and models with interaction terms. Our results were robust across specifications
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TABLE 3
Linear probability model for IC
Care sample Single sample Disabled single sample
All Disabled All Disabled MA eligible MA ineligible
Covariate (N =11,501) (N =5,197) (N =5,756) (N =2,818) (N =1,566) (N =1,252)
Married/partnered 0.165∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗
(0.00949) (0.0160)
Siblings 0.00215 0.000539 0.00481 0.000869 0.00270 −0.00287
(0.00160) (0.00285) (0.00304) (0.00478) (0.00593) (0.00822)
No. of kids 0.00675∗∗∗ 0.0114∗∗∗ 0.0100∗∗∗ 0.0137∗∗∗ 0.0115∗ 0.0190∗
(0.00163) (0.00276) (0.00278) (0.00411) (0.00492) (0.00746)
Grandkids −0.000244 −0.00596 −0.00308 −0.0116 −0.00860 −0.0121
(0.00366) (0.00548) (0.00535) (0.00704) (0.00813) (0.0134)
# (I)ADLs −0.0412∗∗∗ −0.0414∗∗∗ −0.0465∗∗∗ −0.0414∗∗∗ −0.0441∗∗∗ −0.0383∗∗∗
(0.00164) (0.00241) (0.00250) (0.00362) (0.00485) (0.00557)
Dementia −0.104∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗ −0.126∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗ −0.134∗∗∗
(0.0103) (0.0143) (0.0161) (0.0202) (0.0277) (0.0301)
Low wealth 0.0898∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.0962∗∗ 0.0665
(0.0102) (0.0159) (0.0152) (0.0229) (0.0323) (0.0439)
Medium wealth 0.110∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.0802
(0.0118) (0.0192) (0.0189) (0.0274) (0.0485) (0.0451)
High wealth 0.0972∗∗∗ 0.0897∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.172 0.117∗
(0.0149) (0.0242) (0.0242) (0.0332) (0.106) (0.0458)
Log income 0.0275 0.0569 0.105∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 0.136 0.293∗∗
(0.0269) (0.0563) (0.0435) (0.0533) (0.0743) (0.0989)
(Log income)2 −0.00191 −0.00280 −0.00677∗∗ −0.0146∗∗∗ −0.00678 −0.0179∗∗∗
(0.00140) (0.00294) (0.00249) (0.00311) (0.00523) (0.00514)
Caucasian −0.0694∗∗∗ −0.116∗∗∗ −0.0994∗∗∗ −0.171∗∗∗ −0.186∗∗∗ −0.151∗∗∗
(0.00901) (0.0150) (0.0155) (0.0234) (0.0281) (0.0448)
Some college (kid) −0.0145 −0.0283∗ −0.0350∗ −0.0565∗∗ −0.0387 −0.0774∗
(0.00829) (0.0140) (0.0147) (0.0217) (0.0284) (0.0333)
College (kid) −0.0818∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗∗ −0.142∗∗∗ −0.184∗∗∗ −0.165∗∗∗ −0.200∗∗∗
(0.0129) (0.0199) (0.0209) (0.0273) (0.0406) (0.0386)
Linear probability model with dependent variable IC. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.05, ∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗∗p<0.001.
Three samples: (1) the care sample (see text), (2) widower/singles from the care sample, and (3) disabled widower/singles
from the care sample. All: regression uses all individuals in sample. Disabled : restricted to individuals receiving at least
90 h of monthly care. Medicaid (MA) eligible: non-housing wealth < $2,000 and income < $20,500. #(I)ADLs: count
index (0–10); number of functional limitations with ADL and IADL. Dementia: dummy variable; whether a doctor has
ever diagnosed a memory-related disease. For care sample, which includes couples and singles, low wealth is $7.5k–
$135k, medium wealth is $135k–$405k, and high wealth is >$405k; the omitted category is wealth below $7.5k. For
regression using singles we lower the wealth thresholds: low wealth is $5k–$90k, medium wealth is $90k–$270k, and
high wealth is >$270k; the omitted category is wealth below $5k. Income includes social security, and all other sources
of income. Caucasian: non-hispanic white, about one-third in our sample. Some college (kid): average years of children’s
education is between 13 and 16 years. College (kid): 16 years and more; the omitted category is that average schooling
is below 13 years. Not all covariates are shown here; see Online Appendix Table 5 for full regressions.
key for the IC decision. Parent household wealth makes IC more likely when moving from no
wealth (the omitted category) to low wealth. Differences in the likelihood when moving to higher
wealth categories are small and statistically not significant The effect of elderly’s income is not
robust across specifications In our preferred specification the disabled single sample, the effect
is negative on the relevant income range, but the effect is very weak.15 Finally, we see that there
is a systematic difference based on the ethnicity of individuals even after controlling for a variety
of other characteristics. Ceteris paribus, IC is more likely for non-Caucasians (about one-third
15. When comparing an individual at the 10th percentile of the income distribution with one at the 90th percentile,
ceteris paribus, the decrease in the probability of IC is 4%.
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in our sample), which suggests a cultural element in the decision for care (e.g. stronger family
values, a norm to care for the parent) and/or discrimination in admissions to NHs.
Under the U.S. system, incentives for entering a nursing home are different for the poor (who
are MAeligible) and the rich. The fina column splits disabled singles into MA-eligibility groups
as a robustness check. We see that even though a disabled individual is MA-eligible, wealth
increases the likelihood of IC (recall that MA-eligible individuals may own housing wealth
due to the homestead exemption). The coefficient on most variables are similar to the other
specifications but the estimates are less precise due to the smaller sample size.
Finally, in all specification we see that an individual’s frailty (the number of (I)ADLs and
dementia—whether a doctor has ever diagnosed amemory-related disease) have a large negative
impact on IC. In view of this result, one may wonder in how far IC really is a feasible choice for
the severely disabled, and if not, for how many elderly a nursing home is the inevitable outcome.
We turn to this question now.
2.5. Is IC really a choice for all elderly?
Despite the negative relationship of disability measures with IC found above, our data suggest
that IC indeed is a choice even for the most severely disabled.16 We fin that 64% of respondents
who currently have a memory-related disease still reside at home. Even among the most frail (10
out of 10 possible (I)ADL conditions plus memory-related disease), about 30% of respondents
are at home. These numbers are not that surprising if we think about the nature of the (I)ADL
limitations; they do not require sophisticated technology but rather large amounts of low-skilled
labour to be taken care of.17 Consistent with this, we fin that many care recipients living in the
community indeed report that they receive high amounts of care. Among community residents
with 6 or more (I)ADL issues, 50% receive more than 192 care hours per month (or more than
6 h per day), 25% receive more than 480 monthly hours (16 daily hours), and 10% of them even
report monthly hours of 621 or more (20.7 per day). When the elderly is additionally afflicte by
a memory-related disease these numbers become substantially higher especially at the median,
see Table 7 in the Online Appendix.
Relatedly, one may wonder for how many elderly FC is the only option, simply because they
lack a social network. In our sample, however, such cases are rare. For example, among singles
with heavy care needs, only 13% are childless. Even among these childless disabled singles, 71%
report at least one informal caregiver, suggesting that they have relatives or friends they are in
close contact with. A full 26% of childless disabled singles receives the majority of their care
from informal caregivers. This suggests that even among childless singles, FC is an option for
most people.
Finally, one may ask in how far disabled elderly are still part of the decision-making process
when it comes to the care choice, especially given howwide-spread dementia issues have become.
We fin that among disabled individuals in the care sample, a full 76% declare that they have
not been diagnosed with any memory-related disease. Even among the remaining 24%, there are
certainly many individuals who are still well capable of decision-making: Many memory-related
16. This is in line with Charles and Sevak (2005), who fin that informal home care substantially reduces the
probability of long-term NH use, which they interpret as evidence for IC and NHC being substitutes.
17. Note that being frail is not the same as requiring hospitalization. Nursing facilities are actually not designed to
handle severe medical conditions. If individuals are in need of medical care, the HRS categorizes these cases as hospital
stays. In our model, these stays (which are typically of much shorter duration than NH stays) will be included in the
medical-cost shock process.
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TABLE 4
Compensation of caregivers
Contemporaneous exchange Potential bequest (no contemporaneous exchange)
Rent-free Home transfer Money Total Housing wealth Life insurance Financial wealth Total
47.3% 15.0% Negligible 62.3% 11.6% 10.0% 3.8% 25.4%
Data source:HRSwaves 2000–2010. Contemporaneous exchange. Rent-free: child lives in parent’s home.Home transfer:
child lives in home whose ownership was transfered to him/her by the parent (median housing wealth is $65K). Potential
bequest, no contemporaneous exchange. Housing wealth: respondent owns home (median $63.1K). Life insurance:
respondent does not own home but children beneficiarie of life insurance. Financial wealth: no home, no life insurance,
but respondent has at least $7K (approximately the annual imputed rent); median $70.4K. For remaining 12.3% there is
no measurable compensation in the data.
diseases progress slowly and can be diagnosed in early stages.We thus argue that the incapability
to make decisions is, to a firs order, a minor issue.18
In summary, our data are in line with the notion that typically there is a choice between staying
in the community and going to a nursing home and that the large majority of disabled elderly is
still capable of decision-making when the care choice is made.
2.6. How are informal caregivers compensated?
We now present evidence that child caregivers receive substantial economic compensation. We
defin a child-caregiver family as a disabled widow(er)/single parent with at least one heavy-
helper child who receives the majority of care hours informally (recall that in these cases there
is typically one heavy-helper kid). We refer to transfers that occur in the same time period as
care is reported as contemporaneous exchange. We present evidence across families, that is, we
measure transfers from the parent generation to the child generation in child-caregiver families
and compare them to formal-caregiver families, that is disabled widow(er)/single parents that
receive the majority of care formally. In child-caregiver families for which there are no such
transfers, we study how much wealth the parent holds, and refer to it as potential bequest, a
mechanism which previous literature has found to be important.
Table 4 provides an overview of our classification Themost common form of compensation is
that children live rent-free in the parent’s home (in the vastmajority of cases only the heavy-helper
child co-resides), whereas this is the case in only 3.9% of formal-caregiver families. Considering
thatmedian gross rents in theU.S. in the year 2000were $602/month (U.S. Census Bureau, 2003),
rent-free living constitutes a sizeable transfer. In another 15.0% of child-caregiver families, the
parent has transferred ownership of her home to children (this number is 0.8% in formal-caregiver
families). In our data, financia transfers to caregiving children are infrequent and small (the 90th
percentile is merely $500 annually, including zeros) and so we are ignoring these cases in this
category. Thus, substantial contemporaneous transfers to the child generation take place in 62.3%
of child-caregiver families. In addition to these contemporaneous transfers, children may also
expect a bequest (not shown in the table).
For another 25.4% of child-caregiver families, we fin that there is no contemporaneous
transfer, but that the child can expect a bequest. Most common is that the parent has housing
wealth. The second-most common case is that there is no housing wealth, but that the child is
18. Note that even when the elderly is incapable of decision-making, there are many mechanisms that can lead to
decisions that are as if the elderly was still deciding, such as pressure on caregiving children to decide in the elderly’s
best interest that is exerted by siblings, other family members, and the wider society.
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the beneficiar of life insurance. Finally, the remainder of the potential-bequest group is made up
by parents who have neither housing wealth nor life insurance but own substantial, at least $7K,
financia wealth.19
Finally, in only 12.3% of child-caregiver families do we fin neither contemporaneous
exchange nor potential bequests. Our model will rationalize such behaviour by altruism.
3. THE MODEL
We now build a quantitative dynamic model that is motivated by the stylized facts established in
the previous section: (1) IC is a feasible choice for most elderly, but it entails large investments
of time by the caregiver that are usually incompatible with full-time work, (2) the vast majority
of care goes to disabled elderly (i.e. those with the most severe conditions), (3) IC is usually
concentrated on one caregiver: the spouse for the married, and a child for singles, (4) IC is more
likely the lower the opportunity cost of the child, and the higher the wealth of the parent is, and
(5) caregiving children receive substantial compensation.
Time is continuous. The economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals. The
population grows at a constant rate g. An individual’s age is denoted by j. Individuals work when
j∈[0,jret), where jret is the retirement age, and then retire. The maximum lifespan is given by
jdth =2jret . Markets to insure against risk are absent; there is a savings technologywith exogenous
return r, and agents face a no-borrowing constraint.
3.1. Families
3.1.1. Family structure. A family is made up of two decision units, or agents: a kid
generation (or just kid, indexed by k) of age jk ∈[0,jret) and a parent generation (or just parent,
indexed by p) of age jp = jk +jret . There is a continuum of families for each kid age jk ∈[0,jret)
in the economy. In each family, the parent generation consists of one household, whereas the
kid generation consists of a measure (1+ν) households. Consistency with the population growth
rate requires ν=egjret −1. A kid household has two individuals: one female and one male.20 A
parent household consists of np ∈[1,2] members: one female (wife, or widow when np =1) and a
male (husband ) of measure (np−1). The measure of husbands decreases deterministically over
retirement age;more on this below.This ismerely amodellingdevice that keeps the dimensionality
of the state space manageable, while capturing aspects of reality that are quantitatively important
but not the main focus of our analysis.
3.1.2. Sources of uncertainty and household structure. We firs establish some useful
notation. A family’s state is given by the vector z≡ (ak ,ap,s,k ,p,jk ). ak ≥0 denotes the kid’s
wealth, and ap ≥0 the parent’s. k and p are productivity states from a set E ≡{1,...,N }.
s∈{0,1} is a binary disability state for the wife in the parent generation. s=0 stands for healthy;
19. Table 8 in the Online Appendix compares transfers to children within child-caregiver families. We fin that a
heavy-helper child receives transfers (co-residence, home of parent, beneficiar of life insurance) much more frequently
than her non-heavy-helper siblings. In terms of realized bequests, Groneck (2017) find that caregiving children receive
substantially higher bequests than non-caregiving siblings.
20. We assume an asexual model to simplify matters. Our families can best be imagined as matrilineal dynasties
in which each parent household has (1+ν) daughters and (1+ν) sons. All sons leave their dynasty at age j=0 and form
matches with daughters from families that are identical to their own in all characteristics (i.e.we implicitly assume perfect
assortative mating).
12
s=1 corresponds to disabled (in the sense of our empirical work, i.e. requiring care for at least
90 h per month).
The kid agent faces uncertainty only about her labour productivity: k follows a Poisson
process with age-independent hazard matrix δ =[δ(i,j)].21 The kid household’s endowment
in labour efficienc units is given by a function y(jk ,k ). Within each kid household, a fraction
β∈ (0,1) of efficienc units pertains to the male and a fraction (1−β) to the female. Once the
kid generation retires, it splits up into (1+ν) separate parent households. A parent household
keeps the productivity state it has at the point of retirement, that is p =kjret , and receives an
age-invariant pension flo , yp(p), per household member. A new family is formed by a match
of the parent household with a new kid. The new kid inherits the productivity of the parent and
enters the economy with zero wealth.
Thewife in the parent generation facesLTCandmortality risk.At jp = jret , she starts out healthy
(s=0). From jret on, she faces hazard rate δs(jp,p) of transiting into the disabled state (s=1),
which is absorbing. In both states, she faces a mortality hazard δd (jp,p,s).When the death shock
hits, both wife and husband (if still alive) in the parent generation die. All assets, ap, are then
transferred to the kid generation.22 We now turn to the modelling of the husband, which aims
to capture three facts: Males typically have LTC needs first are outlived by their spouses, and
obtain care mostly from their spouses. To economize on the number of states, we assume that
the husband diminishes deterministically in size. Let np(jp,p,s)∈[1,2] be the measure of alive
individuals in the parent generation. We assume that the husband dies once the wife becomes
disabled, that is np(·,·,s=1)=1. This state captures the (largely female) single population of
disabled elderly that we are mainly interested in. While the wife is healthy, we assume that the
function np(·,p,0) smoothly decreases in age jp, np(·)−1 being the measure of males alive.
Furthermore, as long as the wife is healthy, a measure sm(jp,p) of the husband is disabled and
requires LTC.An exogenous fraction ι∈[0,1] of this disabled husband receives IC from his wife
(at zero cost). The remaining fraction, (1−ι), receives PP care in a nursing home.
Finally, the parent faces medical-spending risk. At a hazard rate δm(jp,p,s), a medical event
occurs to each individual, meaning that the household’s probability of facing a medical event
over an interval of infinitesima length dt is [np(·)×δm(·)]dt. Given a medical event, the parent
incurs a lump-sum medical cost M , which is drawn from the cdf Fm(M ).
3.1.3. Choices: care, gifts, consumption, and savings. Parent healthy (s=0). As long
as s=0, households face a standard consumption-savings problem with the additional possibility
of gifts. In each instant, both agents firs decide on a non-negative gift flo , {gi}i∈{k,p} (gifts, or
altruistically-motivated transfers), to the other agent in this family, followed by the choice of
a non-negative consumption flo , {ci}i∈{k,p}. Savings are then residually determined from the
budget constraint.
Parent disabled (s=1). A disabled widow either has to obtain IC from the kid or FC. The
family’s IC decision is denoted by h∈{0,1}. When IC occurs (h=1) the female in one of the kid
households (the marginal household ) does not supply labour to the market, and the parent can
give a non-negative exchange-motivated transfer flo Q≥0 to the kid. Formal care is either paid
21. A Poisson process is the continuous-time analogue of a Markov process in discrete time. δ (i,j) is the hazard
rate of transitioning from i to j , meaning that the probability of transitioning from state i to j is δ (i,j)dj over an
interval of infinitesima length dj.
22. We do not model an estate tax since in the U.S. only the estates of the wealthiest 0.2% of households pay estate
taxes, see Joint Committee on Taxation, History, Present Law, and Analysis of the Federal Wealth Transfer Tax System
(2015).
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for privately (private-payer care, PP) or by the government throughmeans-testedMedicaid (MA).
In PP care, the parent has to buy basic care services at market price pbc; these capture the flo
cost of care, excluding room, board, amenities, and any specialized medical procedures. For
the purposes of our model, we treat both NHC and FHC under the category FC.23 The parent’s
MA decision is denoted by m∈{0,1}. We will describe the MA means-test and the timing and
bargaining protocols for care decisions in Section 3.1.5.
3.1.4. Taxes and government transfers. The government levies a linear social-security
payroll tax, τss >0, on labour earnings. It also runs a progressive income tax system, which works
as follows. A household’s taxable income, ytax (the sum of labour and capital income) is taxed at
rate τ (ytax), where τ (·) is an increasing function. Social-security (SS) benefit are not taxed. Tax
payments of the parent household, T p, and the kid household, T k , depend on the state z and the
IC decision h as follows:
T p(z) = rapτ (rap),
T k (z,h) = τssyl +
[
(1−τss)yl +yk
]
τ
(
(1−τss)yl +yk
)
,
where yl = [1−h(1−β)]wy(jk ,k ), (labour income)
yk = ra
k
1+ν , (capital income)
where w is the wage rate. Parents only pay taxes on asset returns but not on SS benefits Kids pay
SS contributions on labour income and income taxes.24 Note that if τ (·) is an increasing function
(i.e. if income taxation is progressive), then this constitutes an implicit subsidy for IC since the
kid household pays a lower tax rate if h=1. It is understood in the above formula that h=0 for
the infra-marginal kid household.
Agents also receive government transfers for LTC and medical events. The kid receives an IC
subsidy flo , sic ≥0, whenever IC occurs (h=1). The parent receives a PP subsidy flo , spp ≥0,
whenever she is in PP care (s=1 and h=m=0). The same subsidies are paid for the fractional
disabled husbands who receive IC and PP. Finally, the government pays a lump sum M −ap to
the parent in case a medical shock exceeds the stock of wealth.25
3.1.5. Timing and Medicaid (MA) means test. Wenowdescribe the timing of decisions
over an instant of time, which occurs in four stages.
Stage 1: Bargaining on IC.The family considers whether to undertake IC and what the exchange-
motivated transfer Q≥0 should be in this case. If IC generates surplus for both parent and kid,
IC takes place (h=1). Q is pinned down through generalized Nash bargaining, where the kid has
bargaining weight ω∈[0,1].
23. For the purposes of our analysis, pooling NHC and FHC under FC is reasonable. The cost of FHC and NHC is
rather similar in the data. From NH expenditure data, see the calibration in Section 4, we estimate the annual cost of basic
care services in a nursing home to be 21,640$ (in year-2000$). As for FHC, in our care sample a disabled widower/single
living in the community receives a median of 210 hours of care monthly. According to the BLS the hourly mean wage of
a home health aide is $10.93 (this is for 2015; http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes311011.htm). Thus, the annual cost of
FHC is about 27,500$ (in 2015), or about 20,000$ in 2000 when adjusting for inflation
24. Recall that the kid generation consists of (1+ν) households, thus the generation’s capital earnings have to be
divided by (1+ν) to obtain capital earnings on the household level.
25. This models a means-tested part of Medicaid that insures poor families against medical-spending shocks.
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Stage 2: Gift-giving. Next, kid and parent choose the gift flow gp ≥0 and gk ≥0 simultaneously.
This is especially relevant if the family chooses FC in Stage 1: The kid can enable the parent to
avoid Medicaid by helping to pay privately for a nursing home.26
Stage 3: Medicaid decision. In case the family has chosen FC (h=0), the parent decides if to
opt for MA (m=1) or for PP (m=0). MA is free but means-tested: The elderly has to hand over
to the government the entire stock of wealth, ap, the pension flo , yp(p), and any gift flo , gk .
The parent receives a consumption floo Cma; this floo includes any negative utility from MA,
such as stigma effects and poorer quality of the nursing home.27 If PP is chosen (h=m=0),
the parent pays the market price of basic care services, pbc, and receives a subsidy flo from
the government, spp. Unlike in MA, in PP the parent can freely decide consumption, cp, and
gifts, gp. Following Kopecky and Koreshkova (2014), we will interpret pbc +cp as the parent’s
NH expenditures. The variable component cp captures room and board and the amenities of the
facility. This modelling strategy allows us to represent the fact that there is large variation in NH
quality and expenditures.
Stage 4: Consumption-savings decision. In the last decision stage, parent and kid simultaneously
choose their consumption flows cp and ck . Finally, both agents receive interest payments on their
assets and collect utility. After this, the game moves on to the next instant.
3.1.6. Preferences. Per-period felicity of the kid from consumption expenditure, ck , is
given by
uk (ck )= 2(1+ν)
1−γ
(
ck
(1+ν)φ(2)
)1−γ
,
where γ >0 is the parameter of relative risk aversion and where φ(n)=1+0.7(n−1) is
an equivalence scale that adjusts consumption for household size.28 The kid generation’s
consumption expenditure, ck , is divided by the number of households, (1+ν), and the equivalence
scale, φ(2), to obtain individual-level consumption. Individual flo felicity is then multiplied by
the number of individuals, 2(1+ν).
Similarly, per-period felicity for the parent is
up(cp,h;z)= n
p(z)
1−γ
(
cp−s(1−h)Cf
φ
(
np(z)
)
)1−γ
.
When the parent is healthy (s=0) or when IC takes place (h=1), this felicity functional is
analogous to the kid’s. When the parent receives FC, however, the term involving the felicity
penalty Cf becomes relevant. Cf is a parameter that governs the parent’s preference for IC. The
interpretation is that when in FC, the parent requires Cf more units of consumption than in IC to
26. Note that the sequencing matters here. If the gift-giving stage took place after the Medicaid decision, the parent
could hold the child hostage as follows. By deciding m=0, the parent could commit, at least over a short period of time,
not to take advantage of the government’s MA provision. But then, by staying out of MA, the parent would force the
altruistic child to give transfers to the parent if her pension is not sufficien to pay for private care. We do not think that
the elderly can credibly threaten to reject government aid and thus discarded this modelling strategy.
27. We rule out that the kid gives gifts to the parent to lift her consumption level above Cma in MA. The assumption
is that the government only pays for basic care services and that individuals have to accept this consumption floo .
28. See Bick and Choi (2013) for an analysis of equivalence scales and weighting schemes of utility by household
size.
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be indifferent between the two scenarios.29 From survey evidence, we expect Cf to be positive—
the elderly typically say they prefer staying at home to going to a nursing home.30 Note that our
additive specificatio makes IC relatively more attractive for poor people. The higher a person’s
consumption level, the lower is the percentage increase in consumption required to make her
prefer formal over IC.
The kid’s flo utility is uk (·)+αkup(·). The parent has flo utility up(·)+αpuk (·). The
parameters αk ,αp ∈[0,1] govern the strength of altruism. Once dead, the parent values the kid’s
felicity at αp, the grandchild’s felicity at (αp)2, and so forth.31 Future utility flow are discounted
at rate ρ>0 by all agents.
3.1.7. Flow budget constraints. Before we present the value functions that characterize
the agents’problems recursively over the four stages of the instantaneous game,we present agents’
flo budget constraints consolidated over the four stages of an instant. They show all potential
revenues and outlays in one place and thus serve as a summary of the physical environment.32
dak =
(
rak −ck −gk +gp+(1+ν)[y(jk ,k )−T k (z,0)] (1)
+sh[Q+sic −(1−β)y(jk ,k )−T k (z,1)+T k (z,0)] )dj,
dap =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
(
rap−cp+gk −gp+yp(p)−T p(z)−shQ−s(1−h)(pbc −spp)
+(1−s)sm
[
ιsic −(1−ι)(pbc −spp)
] )
dj−min{M ,ap} if m=0,
−ap if m=1.
(2)
If the wife does not require LTC (s=0) or care is formal (h=0), the kid receives flo income
from savings, rak , and the (1+ν) households’ labour earnings, y(jk ,k ). It pays taxes on these
earnings, consumes, and may give or receive gifts. When the marginal kid household gives IC
(s=h=1), then there is an inflo of transfers from parent and government, Q+sic, but also an
opportunity cost from lost labour income, (1−β)y(·), which is again partially offset by a reduction
in tax payments.
Note that all changes to the kid’s wealth are flows (they are all multiplied by dj), whereas
the parent’s wealth may decrease by a lump sum. Such lump-sum payments may occur for two
reasons: medical-spending shocks, M , and Medicaid uptake (m=1). The remaining items on the
parent’s budget constraint are flows most of which are familiar from the kid’s constraint. The
parent pays Q to the kid in case of IC (s=h=1), she pays (pbc −spp) for care in a nursing home
29. Our preference specificatio assumes that the kid does not experience more disutility from care than from
working. However, there is evidence that caregivers experience high levels of stress and other problems. In view of this
evidence, we have experimented with a version of the model that includes a disutility-of-care parameter, ξ . First, we
found that a model with ξ >0 and Cf =0 could not generate as much IC as there is in the data. The reason is that many
families choose IC over FC even if there are economic losses to the family as a whole.When letting both ξ >0 and Cf >0,
we faced an identificatio problem we could not overcome: For any model with ξ >0 and Cf >0, we could fin a model
C˜f >Cf and ξ˜ <ξ such that the two models delivered predictions that were almost indistinguishable. The intuition can
be gleaned from a unitary framework (αp =αk =1): In such a model, ξ and Cf describe exactly the same preferences (if
they enter the felicity functionals in the same functional form).
30. According to the survey Aging in place (2011), 90% of seniors say they want to stay in their home as long as
possible.
31. This is standard in the literature on altruism and gives rise to a simple recursive formulation for value functions.
32. These budget constraints are only valid while the death shock does not hit the parent. In the case this shock hits,
an additional (lump-sum) term +ap appears in the kid’s budget constraint; the parent agent disappears.
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in the case of PP (s=1,h=0), and she has outlays and subsidy income for the measure sm of
disabled husbands who are residing in the household when the wife is healthy (s=0).
3.1.8. Agents’ problems. Agents’ decision problems are characterized by Hamilton–
Jacobi–Bellman equations (HJB). The value functions V k and V p satisfy the HJBs
ρV i(z)=V ijk (z)+J i +H i,1(z,V
p
ap ,V
p
ak
,V kap ,V
k
ak︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Va
), i∈{k,p}, (3)
where subscripts to V i denote partial derivatives. J i stands for a series of jump terms that
encode stochasticity of productivity, medical-spending, health, and death.AppendixA.1 gives the
definitio of J i and other details on the HJBs. {H i,1(·)}i=k,p are Hamiltonian functions that take
the state, z, and the vector of partial derivatives,Va, as arguments. Equation (3) is thus a first-orde
partial differential equation (PDE). We now derive the Hamiltonian functions {H i,1(·)}i=k,p by
backward induction on the stages of the instantaneous game. We do this for the general case
when the parent is disabled; only Stages 2 and 4 are relevant when she is not disabled. Let H i,n(·)
denote the Hamiltonian of player i in the n’th stage of the game. Also, let yi,n denote player i’s
stage-n flow-income-on-hand which is determined by decisions in the stages before n. We also
defin the vector yn ≡[yk,n,yp,n].
Stage 4: Consumption-savings decision. Given the IC decision, h, theMAdecision, m, and Stage-
4 incomes, y4, both players optimally trade off instantaneous felicity and the marginal value of
savings:
H k,4(z,Va;y4,h,m)= max
ck∈Ck
{
αkup(cp,h;z)+uk (ck )+ a˙pV kap + a˙kV kak
}
, (4)
H p,4(z,Va;y4,h,m)= max
cp∈Cp
{
up(cp,h;z)+αpuk (ck )+ a˙pV pap + a˙kV pak
}
, (5)
where Ci =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
[0,∞) if ai >0,
{Cma} if i=p and m=1,
[0,yi,4] otherwise,
a˙i =yi,4−ci for i∈{k,p}.
Note that consumption cannot exceed flo income once wealth is depleted (ai =0), in which
case the agent may be constrained. Parents in MA are bound to consume the consumption
floo .33
Stage 3: Medicaid decision. We guess for now that the parent will only choose MA once she
has zero assets. We will later verify that the parent’s value function is increasing in ap, which is
sufficien for this choice to be optimal. To see this, note that the parent could always delay MA
by an instant, buy PP instead, and choose consumption cp >Cma. This strategy obviously yields
a higher utility flo and higher assets (and thus more future options) after an instant dj than
handing in a positive stock of wealth to the government. Given the IC decision, h, and Stage-3
33. Formally, we allow for yp,4<0 in Stage 4. In this case we set Cp =∅ and H p4 =−∞.
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incomes, y3, the Stage-3 Hamiltonians are as follows:
H i,3(z,Va;y3,h)= mH i,4(z,Va;[yk,3,Cma],0,1) (6)
+(1−m)H i,4(z,Va;[yk,3,yp,3−pbc +spp],h,0), for i∈{k,p},
where m=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if s=1 and h=0 and ap =0 and
H p,4(·;[yk,3,Cma],0,1)>H p,4(·;[yk,3,yp,3−pbc +spp],0,0),
0 otherwise.
The second equation gives the optimal MA decision. This decision is relevant only if the game
arrives at the formal-care node (s=1 and h=0) and the parent is broke (ap =0). The parent
chooses MA if the value from doing so in the Stage 3 is higher than that of choosing PP. In MA,
the means test implies that the parent enters the next stage with income-on-hand Cma. In PP care,
the parent has to pay the price of a nursing home minus the government subsidy.
Stage 2: Gift-giving Given the IC decision, h, and Stage-2 incomes, y2, the Stage-2 Hamiltonians
are as follows:
H k,2(z,Va;y2,h)= max
gk∈Gk
H k,3(z,Va;[yk,2+gp−gk ,yp,2−gp+gk ],h), (7)
H p,2(z,Va;y2,h)= max
gp∈Gp H
p,3(z,Va;[yk,2+gp−gk ,yp,2−gp+gk ],h), (8)
where Gi =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
[0,∞) if ai >0,
{0} if i=p and s=1 and h=0 and ap =0,
[0,yi,2] otherwise.
Players choose non-negative gift flows which are constrained to their income-on-hand in case
they have zero wealth. We rule out gifts by parents in FC when they have zero wealth.34
Stage 1: Bargaining on IC Given the state, z, and value-function derivatives, Va, the Stage-1
Hamiltonians are as follows:
H i,1(z,Va)=H i,2
(
z,Va;[(1−h)yk,fc +h(yk,ic +Q∗),yp,1−Q∗],h
)
for i∈{k,p}, (9)
where yp,1=rap+yp(p)−T p(z)+(1−s)sm[ιsic −(1−ι)(pbc −spp)],
yk,fc =rak +(1+ν)[y(jk ,k )−T k (z,0)],
yk,ic =rak +(1+ν−β)y(jk ,k )−T k (z,1)−νT k (z,0)+sic,
h=
{
1 if s=1 and ∃ Q≥0 s.t. Sp(Q)≥0 and Sk (Q)≥0,
0 otherwise,
(10)
where Si(Q)=H i,2(z,Va;[yk,ic +Q,yp,1−Q],1)−H i,2(z,Va;[yk,fc,yp,1],0), (11)
and Q∗=
{
argmaxQ≥0
{[Sk (Q)]ω[Sp(Q)]1−ω} if h=1,
0 otherwise.
(12)
34. This is not a strong assumption. The government has control on the SS benefit of Medicaid recipients, making
gifts to children impossible for a parent who has no wealth. Also for elderly in PP with zero wealth, gift-giving is almost
impossible — private NHs are expensive in the U.S., and usually exceed SS benefit by far.
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Informal care is provided to a disabled parent if there exists a non-negative transfer Q
such that both players’ surplus is positive. The surplus is the difference between the
Hamiltonians, {H i,2}i∈{k,p}, under the IC scenario and the formal-care scenario in Stage 2. For
the parent, the Stage-2 income under IC is lowered by Q with respect to FC since she has to
pay the transfer. The kid receives the transfer Q only under IC. But there is also a difference
in income due to labour supply (it is yk,ic for h=1, but yk,fc for h=0). Gross labour income
is lower in IC since the marginal caregiver does not work. On the other hand, the kid receives
the IC subsidy, sic, and pays lower income taxes, T k . Finally, if IC takes place, the equilibrium
transfer Q∗ is determined such that it maximizes the Nash-bargaining criterion in (12).
3.2. Firms
There are two market goods that are produced by competitive firm using only labour: a
consumption good, y, and formal (or NH) care, f . The representative fir in the consumption-
goods sector chooses the labour input Ly to solve the profit-maximizatio problem
max
Ly≥0
{
AyLy −wLy
}
, (13)
where Ay >0 is productivity in the consumption-goods sector and w is the wage rate. For
the formal-care sector, we assume that NHs provide basic care services using labour. The
representative nursing home’s problem is
max
Lf ≥0
{
pbcAf Lf −wLf
}
, (14)
where Af >0 is productivity in the NH sector and pbc is the market price of basic care services.
Perfect competition implies that in equilibrium profit are zero in both sectors. Equations (13)
and (14) thus imply that equilibrium prices are
w=Ay, pbc = AyAf . (15)
3.3. Government
The government purchases basic care services in the formal-care market at price pbc and spends
yma consumption goods per NH slot on room, board etc. Thus, the total MAreimbursement rate is
pbc +yma. MANH patients receive a consumption flo Cma.35 The government runs a balanced
budget in each instant. It collects payroll taxes on labour income and taxes income from labour
and capital. From these revenues, it pays social-security benefits MANH slots, subsidies for IC
and PPcare,means-tested benefit formedical expenditures, and a fixe level of other government
consumption. See Appendix A.2 for the detailed budget constraint.
3.4. Equilibrium
We adopt a standard recursive equilibrium definition The parent and kid in each family are best-
responding to each other, being restricted to Markovian strategies. The government balances its
budget in steady state, that is under the ergodic measure of families over the state space. Firms
make zero profit and markets clear. See Appendix A.3 for the detailed equilibrium definition
35. We allow for Cma <yma; this captures that there may be stigma effects of Medicaid and/or that the government
sector provides care inefficientl .
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3.5. Characterizing the IC choice
Using backward induction on the instantaneous gamebetween kid and parent, one can characterize
the consumption, gift-giving, and Medicaid decisions in Stages 2–4, taking as given the value
functions and their partial derivatives (see Section 2.1 of the OnlineAppendix). Here, we focus on
the keymodelling innovation of this article: the determination of IC in a dynamic setting (Stage 1).
The intuition behind this choice is best understood in the special case in which both agents have
positive wealth; we thus concentrate on this case. We provide a general characterization of the
IC decision in Proposition 2.1 in Section 2.3 of the Online Appendix.
To obtain the family’s IC decision, we obtain the surplus functions Si(Q), i∈{k,p}, from IC
as the difference between the Hamiltonians under the scenario that IC takes place and that it does
not for an arbitrary transfer Q≥0, see equation (11). In the special case where both agents have
positive wealth, the surplus functions turn out to be linear in Q and we can back out cut-off values
for IC and the equilibrium transfer in closed form.36
Proposition 3.1. (IC cut-off values). Consider z such that ak >0, ap >0, s=1, and suppose that
V k
ak
(z)>V kap (z), V
p
ap (z)>V
p
ak
(z), and m(z)=0. The parent’s willingness to pay for IC at z, i.e. the
highest Q the parent is willing to pay, is
Q¯p(z)= (Cf +pbc −spp)V
p
ap (z)−(yic −sic)V pak (z)
V pap (z)−V pak (z)
, (16)
where yic ≡yk,fc −yk,ic is the net-income loss the kid experiences when giving IC. The kid’s
reservation transfer, i.e. the lowest Q for which the kid is willing to provide IC at z, is
Qk (z)= (yic −sic)V
k
ak
(z)−(Cf +pbc −spp)V kap (z)
V k
ak
(z)−V kap (z)
. (17)
Since agents will value both their own and the other agent’s wealth positively in equilibrium,
that isV i
aj >0 for i,j∈{k,p}, and sinceV iai >V iaj for i 	= j, we can deduce the following comparative
statics from (16) and (17). The parent’s willingness to pay for IC is increasing in the price of
FC, pbc, her preference for IC, Cf , and the IC subsidy, sic. It is decreasing in the PP subsidy, spp,
and the kid’s opportunity cost, yic. Also, note that the parent’s altruism towards the kid enters
through V p
ak
: The more altruistic the parent is, the more will she value the kid’s wealth.
The kid’s reservation transfer is a mirror image of the parent’s willingness to pay. It is
increasing in the kid’s opportunity cost and the PP subsidy, and it is decreasing in the IC subsidy,
the price of FC, and the parent’s preference for IC. The term V kap encodes altruistic and strategic
bequest considerations by the kid: Themore altruistic the kid and themore likely a sudden bequest
from the parent is, the higher her valuation of parental assets, V kap . Quantitatively, we fin that
the term pbcV kap , which encodes the child’s desire to protect the parent’s wealth from being spent
on NH fees, is key for kids to provide IC at low or even zero contemporaneous transfers.
Proposition 3.2. (IC choice and exchange-motivated transfers). Consider z such that ak >0,
ap >0, s=1, and suppose that V k
ak
(z)>V kap (z) and V
p
ap (z)>V
p
ak
(z). Then the care arrangement
36. Proofs for the following two propositions are provided in the Online Appendix in Section 2.2.
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satisfies
h(z)=I{Cf +pbc −spp ≥yic −sic}, (18)
Q∗(z)=max{0,(1−ω)Qk (z)+ωQ¯p(z)}. (19)
The IC rule h(z) is intra-family efficien : It is identical to the care decision that a family planner
would choose who maximizes a weighted sum of family members’ utilities, taking government
policies and market prices as given.
The family chooses IC if and only if the parent’s utility-adjusted cost of PP exceeds the
opportunity cost of the kid. Also, we see that wealth accumulation helps the family to achieve
efficien outcomes. It enables players to make large-enough side payments to achieve efficienc .
Corollary 3.3. (Comparative statics for IC choice and transfer). Consider z such that ak >0,
ap >0, s=1, and suppose that V k
ak
(z)>V kap (z) and V
p
ap (z)>V
p
ak
(z). Then IC is more likely (1)
the more the old values IC (the higher Cf ), (2) the more expensive FC is (the higher pbc −spp),
and (3) the lower the child’s effective opportunity cost (the lower yic −sic). Fixing the other
derivatives of V p and V k , Q∗ is (1) decreasing in V kap and (2) increasing in V pap .
The IC decision depends in the expected way on the care preference, the NH cost, and the
kid’s opportunity cost. As for wealth effects, the corollary tells us that the more the kid values
the parent’s wealth, be it due to altruism or strategic bequest considerations, the lower is the
contemporaneous transfer that the parent makes in equilibrium. As for parent’s wealth, Q∗ is
higher the lower the parent’s marginal value from wealth, V pap , that is the richer the parent.
The cases in which one or both agents have zero wealth are more cumbersome to characterize.
We will illustrate these cases below using figure generated from the numerical solution of the
model.
3.6. Numerical solution: dynamics and care arrangements
We solve for the equilibrium of the game between the parent and kid numerically, backward-
iterating jointly on the value functions in age. For this, we use the characterizations of care
decisions from the previous section and combine them with the Markov-chain approximation
algorithm from Barczyk and Kredler (2014a) for the consumption-savings and gift-giving
decisions.37 Given the equilibrium laws of motion, we then forward-iterate in age to fin the
ergodic measure of families over the state space, using the same techniques. Online Appendix 4
gives the details.
Figure 1 illustrates typical care arrangements and dynamics of the model (these are generated
for parent aged 80 years, using the calibrated model discussed in Section 4). The various care
arrangements are represented by different shades of grey as a function of (ap,ak ), given different
productivity levels of parent and kid in the sub-figures The wealth dynamics, (a˙p,a˙k ), are
represented by arrows.
37. This Markov-chain approximation method can also be cast as a classical finite-elemen solution techniques for
PDEs. It discretizes continuous states (wealth and age) and uses finit approximations of the value function derivatives
to update the value function.
21
Figure 1
???? ??????? ??? ??????? ?????????
???????? ?? ????? ????? ?? ?????? ???? ?? ????? ?? ?????????? ?????? ?????? ????????? ??? ????????????? high ?? ??? ??? ???? ????? ???? ??
? ???? ???????? low ?? ??? ???????????? ???? ?????? ?????? ????????????? high ?? ??? ???? ????? ???? ?? ??? low ?? ?????? ???? ?????? ??????
?????? ??? ?? ?????? ?? ?????? ?????? ?a˙p,a˙k ?? ?????? ??????? ?????????? ?? ???? ???????? ?? ??????? ????????? ???? Q=?? ? ?????? ??
???? ????????? ???? Q>?? ? ????? ????? ?? ???? ???? ???????? ??????? ???? ???????? ??? ? gk ? ? ?????? ????? ?? ???? ??????? ??? ???????
???? ? ???? ????? ???????? ???? ? ??????
Consumption-savings behaviour. ??? ??? ??????? ?? ????????????????????? ????????? ??? ?????
???? ?????? ?? ???? ? ??? ?????? ????? ?????? ?? ??? ????? ??????? ??? ??? ????????? ????
?????? ?? ??? ?? ?????? ???????????? ??? ??????? ?? ??? ?????? ?? ????????????? ??? ???????
??? ?? ??????? ?? ???? ?? ??? ??? ????????? ?? ?????? ??? ??????????? ???? ?????? ????? ?? ???
??????
Care arrangements. ?? ???????? ???? ? ????????????????????? ???? ?? ????? ????? ?????? ?? ??????
??? ??????? ??? ?????? ??? ???????? ??? ?????? ?????? ?? ?? ???? ? ?? ????? ?? ???? ?? ??? ???
??????? ???? ??? ?????? ???? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ????? ?? ???? ?? ?? ?? ??? ??????? ?? ???
???? ?? ???????? ? ??? ???????? ????????? ?? ?? ???? ?? ??? ??? ?? ??????? ?????? ?? ???????
??? ?????????? ???? ????? ??????? PP+gk ??
???? ??? ????? ??????????? ???? ?? ??? ???? ????? ??? ???????? ?? ????? ????? ???????
??? ???????? ??????? ?? ???? ?? ???? ?? ???? ?? ??? ?????? ???? ??????? ???? ??? ?????? ???
????????? ??????? ???? ??? ??????????? ?? ? ??????? ?? ?????? ?? ???????? ??? ??? ?? ???? ?????
??? ????? ?? ?? ??????????????? ???????? ???? Q=??? ???? ??? ?????? ??? ??? ??????? ????????
??????????????? ????????? ??? ????Q>??????? ??? ?????? ???????? ??? ?????? ??? ??? ???????
?? ????? ??? ????????? ?? ??????? ?? ??????? ??? ????? ??? ?????? ?? ????? ?? ???????? ??? ?????
???? ? ??? ???????? ???????? ??? ?????? ????? ??? ????? ????? ??? ??? ?? ?????????? ???????????
?? ???? ????? ?? ???? ??? ??????? ???????? ??????? ??? ?????? ? ??????? ????? ????????? ??? ????
???????? ???? ??? ??? ?? ?????? ????? ??? ?????? ????? ?? ???? ?? ??? ????? ???????????? ?????
?? ?? ?????????? ????????? ?? Q ????? ??? ????? ???? ????????? ??????? ?? ????? ??? ??? ?????
?????? ?????????? ???? ??? ???? Q=? ?? ?????? ???? ap =??? ??? ????? ??? ????? ?? ??? ???????????
????? ??? ????? ???????? ?? ??? ??? ?? ??? ???? ?? ?? ??? ??????
22
4. CALIBRATION
We calibrate our model to the U.S. economy in the year 2000. We firs describe how we choose
parameters pertaining to demography, health and other risks, technology, and the government.
We estimate these parameters directly from the data or take them from the literature. We then
describe how we identify preference parameters and the bargaining weight jointly by matching
model-generated moments to their data counterparts. Finally, we evaluate the model fi in non-
targeted dimensions and discuss implications of our calibration. OnlineAppendix Section 3 gives
details on our calibration exercise.
4.1. Demography, shocks, technology, and government
Demography. We set model age 0 to be equivalent to the age of 35 years in the data. Individuals
retire atmodel age jret =30 (data age 65 years); certain age of death is jdth =60 (data age 95 years).
We set ν=0.5, that is the kid generation per parent household has three members, corresponding
to the average number of children in our HRS data.38
Labour productivity. We assume that efficienc units of labour have the following (standard)
functional form in age and productivity:
log[y(j,)]=β0+β1j+β2j2+β3j3+σ.
Weestimate the coefficient for the age profil using the year-2000U.S. Census data for individual
full-time workers. We discretize  on a grid with N =7 values using methods equivalent to
those suggested by Tauchen (1986) for discrete-time processes, using an annual autocorrelation
coefficien of ρ =0.95, a standard number in the literature, and the estimate σ =0.78 from the
Census data. In our setting, ρ also governs the correlation of parent’s and kid’s productivity.
Our choice implies that at the age of 50 years, a typical age for child caregivers, the correlation
coefficien between kid’s and parent’s productivity is 0.46,which lines up quitewellwith estimates
on the inter-generational correlation coefficien of (log) lifetime incomes, which are around 0.4
(see the survey by Solon, 1999, Section 4.2). We set β, the fraction of efficienc units pertaining
to the male household member, equal to the male earnings share in married-couple families in
the data; for the year 2000 this fraction is 0.66 (U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics, 2013).
LTC risk and mortality. We obtain estimates for the disability hazard, δs(jp,p), and the mortality
hazard, δd (jp,p,s), from our HRS data. For our estimations, we use logistic regressions on
females only. The regressions include a polynomial in age and interaction terms of age with
education.39 Mortality hazards also depend on the disability state of the individual. We use a
likelihood-ratio criterion to determine the preferred specification
As in our empirical work, we classify an individual as LTC-dependent if more than 90monthly
hours of care are received. Using this variable, we estimate the death hazards, δd (·), from a logistic
hazard model with the covariates described above on the sample of women. As for the disability
38. A shortcoming of our framework is that we can only handle two generations per family, that is parents and
children (but no grandchildren), due to the difficult that strategic interactions present. The waywe choose the initial ages,
initial parent age 65 years and initial kid age 35 years, reflect a compromise we make between a proper demographic
structure and a clean, self-contained model.
39. We consider education since it is a fixe characteristic whereas SS benefit vary with widowhood status. We
map productivity, p, in the model to education in the data as follows. We measure the fraction of elderly females with
high school (qhs) and some college (qsc). We then assign the qhs lowest p-values in the model to high-school, the qsc
next-lowest to some college, etc.
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hazard, δs(·), we face the following complication. In the model the disability state is absorbing,
whereas in the data—while not the norm— some individuals return from disability to the healthy
state. Our strategy to deal with this issue is to firs estimate the fraction of disabled females,
λ(jp,δp), conditional on age and education with a logistic regression.We then back out the hazard
function δs(·) that, given the estimated death hazards δs(·) and the assumption that disability is
absorbing, delivers the observed fraction λ(·) of disabled individuals for each (jp,p) by solving
a system of differential equations.
Section 3.1 in the Online Appendix provides further details on this procedure, shows the
implied life expectancies and expected LTC durations, and gives the hazard functions. Consistent
with the literature, we fin that female and high-education individuals live longer. Low-education
individuals tend to become LTC-dependent at lower ages, when death hazards are relatively low.
On expectation, they thus spend more years in disability than high-education individuals (both
unconditionally and conditional on entry into disability).
Husbands. To pin down np(·), which determines the number of men in parent households, we
proceed as follows. We estimate the number of surviving men above the age of 68 years as a
function of age and education. Assuming that the marriage-age gap is 3 years in all couples, we
then set np(jp,k ,s=0) such that we exactly match the number of men in each age-education cell
in the population.
For care arrangements for husbands in couples, we proceed as follows. We firs estimate the
fraction of disabled males, λm(jp,δp), conditional on age and education with a logistic regression
in the same way as described above for women. We then choose sm(jp,p) such that the total
number of disabled men in the model matches the number of disabled men in the data for each
age-education cell. We determine ι from the fraction of disabled husbands who receive IC, which
in our data are 85%.
Medical expenditures. We follow Kopecky and Koreshkova (2014) to estimate a post-Medicare
and pre-Medicaid out-of-pocket (OOP)medical-expenditure shock process, excluding LTC costs.
For this, we use the HRS and its exit interviews.We choose a log-normal form for the distribution
of payments conditional on an event, Fm(M ), and back out its parameters from the expenditures
of individuals who had exactly one medical event. We then estimate δm(jp,p) from the number
of events occurring to an individual.
Technology and NH. We measure the consumption good y in dollars of year-2000 output. We
defin one efficienc unit of labour as the amount required to produce one unit of y in 2000,
that is we normalize Ay to 1. As for the NH technology, we firs note that the annual Medicaid
reimbursement rate is $38,500 in the data (from Stewart et al., 2009), which is equivalent to
pbc +yma in the model. We now have to pin down how much of this reimbursement rate is spent
on pbc. Letψ =pbc/(pbc +yma) be the fraction of NH spending that is used for basic care services.
From the Minnesota Offic of the Legislative Auditor (1995), we fin that wages, payroll taxes,
and administrative costs in a nursing home accounts for 56.2% of total costs, and so we set
ψ =0.562. We then back out pbc =ψ(pbc +yma)=$21,640. From equation (15), we then fin
that productivity in the formal-care sector is Af =p−1bc = (21,640)−1. The return to the savings
technology is set to r =0.02, which is standard in the literature.
Government. Taxation of joint household income is based on the tax function
by Gouvieia and Strauss (1994), and the Social Security benefi schedule is taken
from Kopecky and Koreshkova (2014). The calibration of the MA reimbursement rate
pbc +yma was discussed above. Subsidies sic and spp are zero in the baseline calibration. Other
government spending is residually determined after paying for LTC and medical expenditures.
Counterfactual policy changes are paid for by a uniform increase to the income tax schedule,
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that is we determine the tax changeτ such that the new income tax schedule, τ˜ (y)=τ (y)+τ ,
makes the government budget constraint hold in steady state.
4.2. Preferences and bargaining weight
We set the coefficien of relative risk aversion γ to 2, a standard value in the macroeconomics
literature. The remaining parameters are obtained bymatching model-generated moments to their
counterparts in the data.
We identify the discount rate ρ by matching the median wealth of parents aged 70–75 years
in the model to the median net worth of households of the same age group in the data. We choose
this age range because we deem it important that the model generates the right amount of wealth
around the time LTC risk becomes substantial, but when most individuals are still alive.
We pin down the consumption penalty for formal care, Cf , and the MA consumption floo ,
Cma, by targeting the percentage of IC recipients and the ratio of total PP toMAspending on NHs.
We target aggregate spending instead of the percentage of MA recipients since there are many
mixed forms between MA and PP in our data, and because getting public LTC spending right
is a priority for us.40 Our PP-to-MA ratio is taken from data for the year 1997 from Giacalone
(2001). We adjust them to the year 2000 using data on price growth in the NH sector given
by Stewart et al. (2009).
We identify parental altruism,αp, bymatching the average gift fromnon-LTCparents to the kid
generation.We include also zero transfers, thus covering both the intensive and extensive margin.
The reason we leave out LTC parents is that they can also give transfers for exchange-motivated
reasons in our model while for non-disabled parents they can only be due to altruism.
To pin down kid’s altruism, αk , we use the average gift the kid generation gives to a parent
residing in a nursing home. Again, such transfers can only flo due to altruism in our model. We
prefer this moment over transfers flowin from kids to non-LTC parents. The latter are quite rare
in the data, and so we worry that we identify altruism of a very selected group of individuals.
Finally, the kid’s bargaining weight, ω, is calibrated to match the mean transfer by parents to
caregiving children in the data, $9,878. To compute this number, we take the weighted average
of the imputed value of rent-free living and the per-annum value of housing assets transferred to
kids, where the weights on the two categories are based on our data in Section 2.6.41
4.3. Results
Table 5 presents the calibration results. The fi to the targeted moments is exact. Our estimate
of the consumption floo is in the ballpark of estimates in the literature.42 The estimate for the
40. A further advantage of using aggregate LTC expenditure data is the heterogeneity in MA reimbursement rates
across states and individuals. We use the ratio on NH spending since we have good data on aggregate expenditures
on NHs, but not for community residents. One may worry that FHC individuals are almost always PP and thus our
measure overstates MAusage. However, we fin that among widow(er)/single disabled FHC individuals, 46.9% are MA
supported, with median OOP expenditure of only $1,000 annually. This coverage is very similar to MA coverage in the
NH population, see Table 8, suggesting that the NH statistics represent the overall formal-care population well.
41. We impute yearly rent frommedian gross rents in the U.S. in the year 2000 of $602/month (U.S. Census Bureau,
2003). The average home value of single parents with heavy-helper children is $86,300 in our data, excluding the top
1% of this group. The expected duration of LTC in our model is 2 years and so to obtain a yearly home-transfer value we
divide the home value by two. The mean exchange transfer is then imputed to be 47.3% of $7,200 plus 15.0% of $43,150.
42. For example, DeNardi et al. (2010) estimate a value of $2,700 (in 1998 dollars) but in their model the coefficien
of relative risk aversion is substantially higher, 3.8.When estimating theMAconsumption floo with this higher coefficien
of relative risk aversion we obtain $4,650 (data not shown here). Thus, our consumption floo is relatively higher. This
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TABLE 5
Calibration
γ r ρ ν β pbc +yma ψ Ay Af ι
2 2% 0.95 0.5 2/3 $38,500 56.2% 1 (21.64)−1 0.85
Parameters calibrated outside of model. γ , coefficien of relative risk aversion, r, interest rate, and ρ , auto-correlation
of efficienc units: standard values. ν, measure of infra-marginal child households: chosen to obtain three children per
parent household. β, male contribution to household income: based onU.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics (2013). pbc +yma ,
annual average Medicaid reimbursement based on National Nursing Home Survey taken from Stewart et al. (2009). ψ ,
percentage of nursing home costs due to care: fromMinnesota Offic of the Legislative Auditor (1995). Ay , goods-sector
productivity: normalization. Af , formal-care-sector productivity: Af =[ψ(pbc +yma)]−1. ι, fraction of disabled husbands
obtaining IC: matches fraction of disabled married males who receive IC.
Age-earnings profil LTC hazard Mortality hazard Medical costs
US Census: 2000 HRS: 2000–2010 HRS: 2000–2010 HRS: 2006–2010
Authors’ own estimates for efficienc units of labour, LTC risk and mortality, and medical expenditures excluding LTC
costs; see main text and Online Appendix for details.
Calibration target Data Model
Median wealth (ages 70–75 years) $178,600 $178,600
IC 44.5% 44.5%
Total PP/MA spending 0.82 0.82
Parent (healthy) gift $1,548 $1,548
Kid gift to parent (PP) $620 $620
Exchange transfer $9,878 $9,878
Parameter Description Value
ρ Discount rate 0.0545
Cf FC consumption penalty $3,800
Cma MA consumption floo $3,020
αp Parent altruism 0.6922
αk Kid altruism 0.0121
ω Kid bargaining weight 0.0205
Parameters calibrated for baseline model. Data source: HRS waves 2000–2010. Median wealth is of coupled and
widow(er)/single households (excluding top 5%). Informal care is fraction of disabled widow(er)/singles receiving IC.
Total PP to MA spending on NHs based on HCFAOffic of the Actuary, National Health Expenditures, from Giacalone
(2001). Parent mean gift is average annual gift from healthy parent(s) aged 65+ years to all non-co-residing children. Kid
mean gift is average gift to PP NH parent. Exchange transfer is based on value of rent-free living and home-transfer to
children in single-parent families with heavy-helper children. All transfers are averages and include zeros.
formal-care consumption penalty, Cf , means that a PP NH resident has to incur a cost of $3,800
before an additional dollar begins to yield the same utility as when receiving IC at home. This is
consistent with survey evidence that the elderly typically prefer to stay in a familiar environment.
The estimate for the parent’s altruism is high. In conjunction with the curvature on the utility
function, it means that a parent chooses a consumption ratio ck/cp = (αp)1/γ =0.832when giving
gifts to the kid.43 This high value also implies that the parent has a strong bequest motive. For
the kid, the equivalent measure is a lot lower: cp/ck = (αk )1/γ =0.11. Finally, we see that almost
all bargaining power has to be assigned to the parent for the model to generate the relatively low
exchange-motivated transfers observed in the data. This will also imply that a substantial fraction
of caregiving kids in the model will be motivated by expected bequests.
can be explained by the introduction of the family-insurance channel in our model: To generate enough Medicaid uptake
in the presence of this additional option, the consumption floo has to become more generous.
43. This measure of altruism is proposed by Barczyk and Kredler (2014a).
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TABLE 7
IC by economic characteristics
IC by kid education
Source High school Some college College
Data 57.9% 47.0% 26.7%
Model 62.3% 42.6 % 0.0%
Data source: HRS waves 2000–2010. Education pertains to average years of education of children in a family with a
widow(er)/single parent and heavy-helper children. Categories correspond to average education of at most 13 years of
schooling, between 13 and 16 years of schooling, and 16 years and more.
IC by parent pension quintile
Source Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Data 47.0% 49.5% 48.2% 43.6% 40.7%
Model 23.8% 44.4% 59.7% 57.0% 45.3%
Data source: HRSwaves 2000–2010. Pension quintiles (social security retirement, spouse or widow benefits of disabled
widow(er)s/singles.
Linear probability model for IC
Source Low wlth Med wlth High wlth Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Some coll Coll
Data 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 −0.08 −0.22
Model 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.20 0.23 0.20 0.12 −0.27 −0.83
Data source: HRS waves 2000–2010. Linear probability model of IC for disabled widow(er)/singles. Low wealth is
<90K, medium wealth is [90K,270K], and high wealth is >270K. Regression uses pension quintiles (social security
retirement, spouse or widow benefits) Omitted variables: no wealth, pension quintile Q1, and average schooling of at
most 13 years. Model estimates based on linear probability model using model-generated data.
at time of death, in order exclude bequests to the spouse; this is the closest data counterpart to
our model. Overall, our model does a good job in generating a realistic bequest distribution.45
Determinants of care arrangements. For our model to serve as a useful tool for evaluating policy,
it is also important that it fit well which families opt for IC. We now consider how the model
performs quantitatively in matching the observed care arrangements by kids’ education, parents’
pension income, and parental wealth.46 The firs part of Table 7 shows that the model does a
decent job in replicating the IC gradient between the two largest categories, high school and
some college. However, the model counterfactually predicts no IC at all when all children in the
family have a college degree. The model probably fails here for two main reasons: (1) education
is an imperfect proxy for opportunity costs (but we assume a one-to-one mapping for the model),
and (2) there is heterogeneity in altruism, which we ignore in our model.
The second part of Table 7 shows IC prevalence, split up by quintiles of the parent’s SS
benefits The model predicts an arch, while the data suggest a slight downward trajectory when
moving to higher pension quintiles. Specificall , our model suggests less IC in families with
pension-poor parents than we observe in the data. This divergence might be driven by the fact
that in reality family values run so strong for some that economic incentives matter less; we fin
evidence consistent with large differences in the preference for IC in the significan and large
loading of the race dummy in our linear probability model (Table 3). Also, while in the model
45. There are several reasons why the estate distribution in the HRS is lower than the wealth distribution may
suggest: large measurement error, cohort effects, high end-of-life expenditures, and costs of dissolving estates.
46. Kid’s productivity in the model is mapped to education as described in Footnote 39 for parents.
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access to a nursing home is frictionless, in reality some Medicaid-finance individuals may face
longer waiting times of being admitted to a nursing home, as NHs preferentially admit PPs (see
Norton, 2000 and references therein). Beyond the firs pension quintile the fi improves. Parents
at the high end of the pension spectrum tend to be associated with children of high opportunity
costs and so PP NH use increases and IC decreases.
Finally, we turn to conditional correlations. We run a linear probability model on model-
generated data, regressing the IC dummy on a polynomial in age and dummies for parental
wealth, public-pension quintiles, and kid education. We compare the results to those obtained
from a regression very similar to the one presented in Section 2.47 The quantitative predictions of
the model are starker than those implied by the data. This is to be expected, since the regression
covariates cover almost all determinants of IC in the model. In the data, however, there are
omitted sources of heterogeneity (such as altruism, the income share of the marginal caregiver,
etc.) and measurement error (especially in the kid’s opportunity cost and parent wealth), both of
which make us expect that the coefficient on economic variables are attenuated downward. The
direction of the model’s implications are, however, very much consistent with the data. In terms
of parent’s wealth, we see that the model successfully replicates the “threshold effect” we fin in
the data: When going from zero to the lowest wealth category, IC becomes more likely, but the
likelihood of IC remains almost unchanged at higher wealth levels. In the data, there is only a
weak relationship between parent’s pension income and the probability of IC. In the model this
relationship is also the weakest; it is hump-shaped whereas in the data it is more noisy. In both the
model and the data, families with higher-educated children are less likely to rely on IC, ceteris
paribus, the coefficien on the college category being by far the largest.
Transfers. Table 8 shows that in termsof non-targeted transfer arrangements, themodel achieves
a decent fit The model is very successful in generating bequest-motivated care in line with the
data. The parent’s high bargaining weight keeps contemporaneous transfers down, but children
in the model still provide care, since they can increase the expected bequest by protecting the
wealth of the parent. The parent does not spend down her wealth recklessly due to the strong
bequest motive implied by altruism, strengthening the bequest channel.
The model understates the number of kids who help out with their parent’s nursing home
expenditure (the extensive margin of gifts), which means that it overshoots on the intensive
margin (recall that the unconditional mean was targeted). For the other targeted moments —
gifts by healthy parents — the model is, however, almost spot-on in the decomposition between
the extensive and the intensive margin. Finally, in line with the data, the model generates very
low transfers from kids to healthy parents. This is because kids’ altruism is weak and the wealth
distribution at this life-cyle stage is tilted in favour of parents. The fi in terms of MA coverage
is satisfactory given that the model is constrained to pure forms of coverage.
NH use and expenditures. The model generates larger PP nursing home expenditures than we
fin from the HRS data, except for the highest percentiles. However, the numbers from the HRS
appear to be quite small in contrast to a Medicaid reimbursement rate of $38,500, which suggests
that there is some measurement error in the HRS data. The literature also hints at this possibility:
Stewart et al. (2009), for example, report an average annual private-NH price in the year 2000
of $45,800, based on the National Nursing Home Survey, which is close to the number predicted
by our model.
Since in the data there are many mixed forms of financing it is also important that the model
can fi the distribution of expenditures when pooling MA and PP individuals together. The third
47. The only difference here is that we now include only public pension income (as in the model), whereas, before
we included all sources of income, and that we use quintiles of pension income instead of the logarithm of income.
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TABLE 8
Non-targeted moments
Description Data Model
Exchange 62.3% 78.8%
Potential bequest 25.4% 21.2%
No compensation 12.3% 0.0%
Parent (healthy) gift to kid 15.0% 14.9%
Kid gift to parent (PP) 7.6% 5.3%
Kid gift to parent (healthy) $85 $0
Full MA 45.7% 62.2%
Mostly MA 10.4% -
Partial MA 9.2% -
PP 34.6% 37.8%
PP NH expenditures ($000)
Source Mean p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99
Data 39.6 22.7 34.6 48.5 66.5 89.0 129.2
Model 52.0 40.5 49.0 61.0 72.2 78.6 88.6
Data source: HRS waves 2000–2010. Transfer arrangements are documented in Section 2.6. Parent (healthy) gift to kid,
fraction of healthy parent households giving positive gift amounts to children. Kid gift to parent (PP), fraction of children
giving positive gift amounts to private-payer parents in nursing home. Kid gift to parent (healthy) is average financia
transfer from kid to non-disabled parents including zeros. MAcoverage is for disabled widow(er)/single individuals with
NH stays of at least 100 days. Full MA: MA-recipient with full coverage. Mostly & partial MA: MA-recipient with some
coverage. PP expenditure statistics are for disabled widow(er)/single individuals conditional on at least $10,000 annual
expenditure. Weights for NH expenditures are adjusted by authors to account for missing values by assigning a higher
weight to non-missing observations.
All NH expenditures ($000)
Source Mean p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99
Data 15.4 0.0 3.2 23.7 46.2 61.0 102.8
Model 19.7 0.0 0.0 43.3 60.1 69.2 83.2
All NH expenditures by pension quintile (mean in $000)
Source Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Data 11.6 12.1 15.6 17.0 22.8
Model 0.1 0.5 3.1 13.5 40.8
Lifetime utilization of nursing home (years)
Source Mean p50 p75 p90 p95 p99
Data 1.1 0.0 0.6 3.7 6.4 12.2
Model 1.1 0.0 0.9 3.8 6.0 11.0
Persistence of NH-utilization time
Source d0 to d0 d1 to d1 d2 to d2 d3 to d3 d4 to d4
Data 93.0 15.6 10.0 5.8 76.2
Model 95.5 2.5 22.2 13.1 91.8
Data source: HRS waves 2000–2010 (includes exit interviews). All NH expenditures for widow(er)s/singles with NH
stays of at least 100 days (to exclude Medicare cases). In model, NH expenditure is zero for Medicaid recipients and
equals cost of basic care plus private consumption for PPs. Weights adjusted by authors to account for missing values by
assigning a higher weight to non-missing observations. Dollar figure converted into year-2000 values. Lifetime NH use
(in years) is cumulative of individuals who are part of the HRS between 1998 and 2012 and are widow(er)/single at time
of death. NH-utilization: Time spend in NH as fraction of time between interviews: d0=0, d1= (0,10%], d2= (10,50%],
d3= (50,90%], d4= (90,100%]. HRS weights are used.
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5.1. Channels determining welfare
There are four sets of frictions in the model: (1) distortionary taxation of labour, (2) incomplete
markets (no insurance against LTC, medical-expenditure, and labour-market risks), (3) the
Medicaid means-test, and (4) lack of commitment within families. To understand the welfare
consequences of policies, it is useful to firs think about the allocation in a first-bes (frictionless)
world, and then to analyse how each type of friction interacts with certain policies.
First-best. Consider a social planner who faces no restrictions and weighs welfare of all agents
equally. The planner’s outcome can be attained in an equilibrium setting with (1) appropriate
lump-sum transfers by the government, (2) insurance markets against all risks, (3) the possibility
to administer Medicaid without a means test, and (4) complete and enforceable contracts between
parents and kids within each family. First, note that given the parameters identifie by our
calibration the planner will not use the MA technology since the utility level u(Cma) delivered by
Medicaid can be attained at lower cost using the PP technology.49 Second, the planner equalizes
marginal utility of consumption across all agents, implying that agents do not bear consumption
risk. Third, for productive efficienc the planner chooses whether care is provided through IC or
PP in each family. It is easy to see that the planner chooses IC if and only if
(1−β)y(jk ,k )<pbc +Cf , (20)
that is if and only if the marginal social cost of IC (the productivity, or gross wage, of the
marginal kid caregiver) is lower than the marginal social benefi (freeing one formal-care worker
up for production plus the utility benefi of IC). Quantitatively, the marginal social benefi of care
amounts to pbc +Cf 
$26,000 in our calibration, and thus all marginal caregivers with gross
earnings below this threshold give IC under the efficien allocation.
Labour-wedge channel. Now we remove lump-sum taxation and instead the government taxes
labour. The private cost of IC (the caregiver’s net wage) is then lower than its social cost (the
caregiver’s gross wage), and thus too much IC takes place. This distortion provides a rationale
for FC subsidies, but against IC subsidies: A FC subsidy reduces the wedge between private and
social cost of IC, whereas an IC subsidy increases it.
Insurance channel. In the absence of insurancemarkets, theLTCshockposes a large consumption
risk for families. Any policy that transfers resources to families in this adverse state has welfare-
enhancing effects, particularly when they flo to poor families with high marginal utility.
Medicaid channel. Medicaid has positive insurance effects and targets the poorest through the
means test. However, there are two drawbacks: (1) The means test distorts the savings decision,
and (2) Medicaid is technologically inferior to other forms of care according to our calibration.
A policy that reduces MA reliance thus has positive effects through these two mechanisms.
Family-commitment channel. Finally, there is the friction that parent and kid within a family
cannot write complete contracts. Efficien risk sharing within the family would require that agents
provide resources to each other in adverse (high-marginal-utility) states of the world, for example
kids should provide care or financia helpwhen the parent is disabled. Productive efficienc would
require that the IC decision is intra-family efficien (i.e. efficien from the family’s point of view,
given the taxes and subsidies in place). Observe that wealth accumulation by parents helps the
family to get closer to efficienc on both counts. In terms of risk sharing, a wealthy parent can
induce the kid to give IC through transfers and bequests. Alternatively, if the child’s opportunity
cost is high, she can spend down her wealth on PP, which is effectively a transfer from the kid as
49. The planner’s cost of attaining utility u(Cma) in PP is pbc +Cf +Cma , whereas it is pbc +yma in MA. Since
Cf +Cma <yma in our calibration, it follows that PP is always a superior choice.
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spending on a nursing home reduces the estate. If the parent is lucky and stays without disability,
she leaves a large bequest to the child, thus relinquishing resources in this favourable state of the
world. As for productive efficienc , Proposition 3.2 tells us that the IC decision is intra-family
efficien if both parent and child have wealth, which occurs because agents can always make side
payments to achieve efficienc . In contrast, for poor parents there may be under-provision of IC:
When the parent has nothing to offer to the kid when disabled, the kid may leave the efficien
risk-sharing agreement, and the parent may be forced into MA.
In summary, we note that the IC subsidy dominates the PP subsidy in all of the channels,
except for the labour-wedge channel. This is because the IC subsidy is more likely to be taken
up by less well-off households and, hence, is more effective than the PP subsidy in providing
insurance, in avoiding MA, and in overcoming commitment problems within families. This will
be key to understand the policy evaluation to which we turn next.
5.2. Non-means-tested IC and PP subsidies
In the firs set of counterfactuals we study non-means-tested subsidies for IC, PP, and for both.
We base the amounts of these subsidies on the German LTC program, introduced in 1995, which
makes subsidies available for either informal or FC. For individuals that we classify as disabled,
the current (as of 2015) home-care subsidy, is $4,375 per year; for individuals living in a nursing
home it is $11,460 per year (in year-2000 dollars).50 We assume that the IC subsidy is paid to
both caregiving kids and parents who give care to husbands (i.e. a caregiver allowance). We also
provide separate results for an IC subsidy that is restricted to working-age individuals (i.e. kids
only).
Table 9 provides an overview of the equilibrium effects of the LTC policy options. In general,
we present the long-run effects on allocations, that is, when using the ergodic distribution over
families resulting from the policy. For welfare, however, we present two consumption-equivalent
variation (CEV) statistics under the veil of ignorance. The short-run CEV is that of a kid born
into the economy precisely at the moment that the government introduces the subsidy, coming as
a surprise to agents. Thus, this kid is matched to a parent who did not anticipate the reform and
made savings choices expecting the baseline policies to be in place. The long-run CEV, in turn, is
for a kid born into the economy with the subsidy in place for an infinit amount of time. This kid
draws a parent from the ergodic measure of families under the counterfactual policy; the parents’
savings decisions were made under full anticipation of the policy.
In the experiment sic ↑, an annual subsidy of $4,375 is given to informal caregivers of any
age. The subsidy strongly reduces MA in favour of IC, also — to a lesser extent — crowding
out PP care. More IC care is provided without contemporaneous compensation from the parent
due to the caregiver allowance. The type of IC that grows most is care not accompanied by a
contemporaneous transfer.
We decompose the tax change required to financ the subsidyτ into three contributions: (1)
τs: the change due to the payout of the subsidy itself, (2)τma: the change due to changes in the
size of the MAprogram, and (3) τinc: changes to income tax revenue, which are chiefl caused
50. Our information is from the Tabelle Pflegeleistungen BRat by the German Ministry of Health as of 2015.
Subsidy amounts depend on care needs, which are classifie into I, II, III, with sub-categories according to dementia.
Most relevant to us are levels II and III, which correspond to daily care of at least 3 h. For spp, we draw on the subsidies
for institutional care: We take the subsidy for level III (1,612 Euros per month), which lies just between the levels for II
and III-Härtefall. For sic, we draw on the subsidies for care at home, which in Germany can be used to pay both formal
and informal caregivers: We firs average the subsidies within II (458 Euros, but 545 with dementia) and then average
again with III (728). We then convert to USD in PPP, use the CPI to deflat to 2000, and convert to yearly amounts.
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TABLE 9
Policy experiments
Costs (change to tax rate
Care type (%) in percentage points) Wealth ($000, age 70-75) Ex-ante CEV (%)
LTC policy IC MA PP τ = τs + τma + τinc p25 p50 p75 Short run Long run
Status quo 44.5% 34.5% 21.0% $52K $179K $391K
sic ↑ 61.1 22.6 16.4 0.09 0.25 −0.24 0.07 41 164 375 0.46 0.25
skic ↑ 61.1 22.5 16.5 −0.04 0.14 −0.24 0.06 44 167 378 0.37 0.22
spp ↑ 24.6 31.0 44.4 0.18 0.31 −0.07 −0.06 48 167 371 0.13 0.01
both↑ 46.6 19.7 33.7 0.20 0.47 −0.29 0.02 36 154 361 0.61 0.31
MA↑ 41.7 38.7 19.6 0.17 0.15 0.02 41 171 386 0.09 −0.04
MA↓ 50.0 27.3 22.7 −0.21 −0.19 −0.02 64 187 394 −0.11 0.04
MA↓,both↑ 48.1 16.2 35.7 0.10 0.48 −0.39 0.01 41 157 363 0.55 0.31
Policies: sic ↑: informal-care subsidy of $4,375 (per year). spp ↑: PP subsidy of $11,460 (per year). MA↑: 20% increase
to both yma and Cma . MA↓:20% reduction in both yma and Cma . sic ↑ + spp ↑: both informal- and formal-care subsidy,
amounts as in sic ↑ and spp ↑. MA↓ + sic ↑: combination of MA↓ and sic ↑. Care arrangements: IC: informal-care
prevalence, MA: Medicaid prevalence, and PP: private-payer prevalence. Costs: τ : change to the income tax rate
required to financ LTC policy. Changes to tax rate due to: payout of subsidy τs, changes in MA (τma), and change to
income taxes (τinc). Changes to government spending on medical shocks are negligible. Wealth: quantiles of wealth
distribution ages 70–75 years. CEV: consumption equivalent variation (for the entire future, all generations of the family,
all states of world) of new-born under the veil of ignorance. Short run: at time of reform (kid faces new tax rate, draws a
parent household from the ergodic distribution of parents under the baseline scenario), long run: after convergence (kid
draws parent household from the ergodic distribution of families under the counterfactual policy).
IC transfers FC Financing IC by kid educ IC by parent pension
LTC policy Exchg Beqst Altrsm gk >0 gk =0 MA HS HS+ Collg Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
status quo 78.8% 21.2% 0.0% 2.0% 35.9% 62.1% 62.3% 42.6% 0.0% 23.8% 44.4% 59.7% 57.0% 45.3%
sic ↑ 73.3 26.6 0.1 3.5 38.6 57.9 86.0 57.6 0.4 55.3 63.5 68.5 66.2 54.6
skic ↑ 73.0 26.9 0.1 3.5 38.8 57.7 86.0 57.7 0.4 55.3 63.7 68.5 66.2 54.6
spp ↑ 92.0 8.0 0.0 4.9 54.0 41.1 51.3 0.0 0.0 17.9 29.8 32.9 27.6 17.9
both↑ 89.0 10.9 0.2 7.4 55.7 36.9 83.6 18.7 0.0 52.6 54.9 49.6 43.8 31.0
MA↑ 80.3 19.7 0.0 1.0 32.6 66.3 58.4 40.1 0.0 20.0 40.0 55.6 55.9 45.2
MA↓ 78.1 21.9 0.0 4.0 41.3 54.7 71.8 45.6 0.0 33.6 56.1 63.7 57.8 45.5
MA↓,both↑ 88.2 11.7 0.0 10.3 58.4 31.3 86.3 19.6 0.0 57.0 56.4 50.8 43.7 30.9
IC Transfer: Exchg: IC with gk >0. Beqst: IC with gk =0, ap >0. Altrsm: IC with gk =ap =0. FC Financing: PP care
with gk >0, PP care with gk =0, MA care. IC by kid educ: IC among education groups; HS is high school; HS+ is more
than high school and less than college. IC by parent pension: IC by parent pension quintile.
by changing labour supply of caregivers.51 The payout of the IC subsidy increases the tax rate by
one-quarter of a percentage point. However, this is offset by crowding-out of the comparatively
expensive MAprogram.A cost of this subsidy is that it shrinks the labour force. But the resulting
loss in tax revenue is fairly small, as IC is taken up by children of low productivity. The most
dramatic increase of IC is among parents with low SS benefit because it allows them to exit MA.
In terms of wealth, we see that savings at age 70–75 years decrease, and more so at the lower end
of the wealth distribution. This is because the subsidy diminishes the need for self-insurance as
it renders family-provided care cheaper.
51. τinc is also affected by changes in savings behaviour, but the labour-supply channel dominates in our
counterfactuals. Changes in the government budget stemming from payments for medical shocks are negligible; such
payments account for only 0.1% of tax revenue in our economy.
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Over the short run, the welfare gain for unborn agents under the veil of ignorance from the IC
subsidy is large:An unborn agent has to be offered a permanent 0.46% increase in consumption in
the baseline scenario (for the entire future, to all agents in her family, and in all states of the world)
to be indifferent to aworld inwhich the IC subsidy is in place. It remains substantial, but decreases
somewhat, from a long-run perspective. The difference is driven by the fact that savings decrease,
and so future new-borns are born into families with poorer parents. We conclude that the positive
effects working through the insurance, Medicaid, and family-commitment channels override the
negative effects that the IC subsidy has through the tax-wedge channel. The distortionary effects
through the tax-wedge channel are relatively small, since largely low-productivity kids take up
the subsidy whose labour-supply distortions are low to start with. The gains through the other
channels are large, again precisely because the policy successfully targets poor families.
It is interesting to compare this unconditional IC subsidy to one which is conditional on
the caregiver being of working age, skic ↑. The care arrangements change in the same way as
before, because the payoffs of the marginal caregivers are affected in the same way. Effects on
the government budget and thus required tax changes are small. But the direct cost of the subsidy
is only about half of that before, due to the fact that about half of all informal caregivers are of
retirement age. This policy turns out to be budget-neutral. Despite its lower cost, welfare gains
of the restricted IC subsidy are smaller. The reason is that in our model, the IC subsidy for the
disabled husband works like an annuity that provides insurance against longevity risk to the
elderly, which is the only feature of sic that is absent from skic.
In the third experiment, spp ↑, an annual subsidy of $11,460 is given to all PP of FC (without a
means test).52 Note that the support by this subsidy is relatively generous, coveringmore than half
of basic care services ($21,600). The subsidy doubles the prevalence of PP care with the increase
being driven almost exclusively by a reduction in IC. This is a stark example of what we may
miss when ignoring the family margin: The outflo from IC (19.9 percentage points) is about
fiv times that from MA (3.5 p.p.). We fin that the decrease in IC occurs especially in families
with medium opportunity costs, allowing many informal caregivers to stay in the workforce and
giving rise to additional tax revenue. However, the PP subsidy leaves the MA population almost
unchanged since for them paying privately for a nursing home is still too expensive. Thus, cost
savings fromMAare more modest than under the IC subsidy. Overall, this subsidy is much more
expensive than the IC subsidy. Savings are reduced, especially in richer families. Lower parent
wealth together with the higher tax rates means that children entering the economy enjoy only
minor welfare gains in the long run. Also the short-run gains are smaller than for the IC subsidy,
as the FC has weaker effects through the insurance, Medicaid, and family-commitment channels.
The gains through the labour-wedge channel are not enough to overcome these.
In the fourth type of policy, we combine the IC subsidy, sic ↑, and the PP subsidy, spp ↑.
According to the model, such a policy would leave IC almost unchanged due to two offsetting
effects. On the one hand, more low-productivity kids provide IC due to the caregiver allowance.
On the other hand, families with medium-productivity kids move from IC to PP. The two effects
are offsetting, leaving income tax revenues almost unaffected. This mix of subsidies decreases
wealth by more than any of the other policies since it provides better insurance for all families.
Thus, this policy allows for increased current consumption and is very popular in the short run. In
the long run, the ex-ante CEV is about half of its short-run counterpart because savings decrease
and the tax rate increases.This policy provides the benefit of the IC and the PPsubsidies discussed
above.
52. This subsidy is also paid to the measure sm(1−ι) of males receiving FC in parent households with s=0.
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5.3. Changes to medicaid
Next, we use themodel to study the consequences of an expansion or a contraction of theMedicaid
programon the economy. In reality, changes to theMAprogramwould be implemented bymaking
eligibility criteria to qualify forMAmore or less stringent.However, since in ourmodelMAuptake
is a choice wemodel changes to theMAprogram by alterations to the consumption floo .We base
the magnitude of the changes to be in the ballpark of the existing variation in MA reimbursement
rates between U.S. states. Finally, we evaluate the policy option in which a cut to theMAprogram
is accompanied by an introduction of both IC and PP subsidies.
In the counterfactual policy experiment MA↑, we study a 20% increase to Cma. We assume
that this increase in Cma is matched by a 20% increase to yma (government expenditures on
non-care consumption per MA recipient), which amounts to an 8.3% (or 3,088$) increase in the
MA reimbursement rate.53 As Table 9 shows, the policy reduces both IC and PP by about 7%.
As MA finance two-thirds of all FC in the counterfactual this policy is relatively expensive.
The additional labour supply helps only little to overcome the increase in MA expenditures as
primarily families with low-productivity children respond who pay fairly low taxes when back in
the labour force. There are also fewer PP of NHs and so additional costs are shifted to the public
sector. The need for self-insurance at the low end of the wealth distribution becomes much less
pressing, thus savings decrease. In the long run, this is the least popular policy option among all
we consider, and even in the short run it leads to only a modest increase in welfare.
Second, consider the opposite policy, MA↓, in which we decrease both Cma and yma by 20%.
The effects are practically themirror image to the previous scenario. Both IC and PP increase. The
existence of the family as an informal-insurance network buffers the loss in public insurance as
children provide additional financia support to PPparents (gk >0). Furthermore, cost savings are
fairly substantial and so the tax rate decreases. As a result of the additional savings and the lower
tax rate, there is actually a small welfare gain from a cut inMedicaid in the long run. But the policy
is the least popular in the short run, driven by the large losses of the oldest and poorest parents,
as we will see in the next section, where we break down the welfare of current generations.
If the U.S. government were to reduce MA our results suggest that it should be accompanied
by an informal and formal care subsidy. The last row of Table 9 shows the effects of combining
the policies MA↓ and IC and PP subsidies of the samemagnitude as before. This combined policy
decreases MA substantially, especially among low-income households. IC increases somewhat
and is now primarily provided by low-productivity children. PP increases by a lot and a relatively
substantial fraction of FC costs are covered by children (10.3% compared to 2.0% under the status
quo). The increase in the tax rate is modest, as gains fromMAsavings are large. There are almost
no effects from changes in the labour supply on the government budget. Despite the cut in MA
this combined policy brings about a large welfare gain even in the short run and thus looks like
a very attractive policy option.
5.4. Welfare of current generations
So far we have focused on welfare implications for kids born into the economy. But what about
the welfare of generations that are alive at the time of the reform? Policies that make large parts of
the electorate worse off are unlikely to garner political support and would thus hardly be feasible.
Table 10 provides consumption equivalent variations (CEVs) for different sub-groups of the
current population, ranked by overall desirability of the reforms.We present averages over CEVs
53. Cutler and Sheiner (1994) report the standard deviation of MAreimbursement rates to be about 10% of average
NH costs.
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TABLE 10
Welfare of currently alive generations (CEV in %)
LTC policy All Parent Kid Parent () Parent (¯) Kid () Kid (¯)
Both↑ 1.59 2.75 1.15 3.18 2.36 1.39 0.90
MA↓, both↑ 1.35 2.32 0.97 2.36 2.28 1.13 0.82
sic ↑ 1.01 1.76 0.72 2.44 1.16 1.01 0.43
skic ↑ 0.74 1.28 0.53 1.68 0.92 0.73 0.33
spp ↑ 0.65 1.19 0.45 0.84 1.51 0.40 0.49
MA↑ 0.40 0.78 0.26 1.35 0.27 0.41 0.10
MA↓ −0.46 −0.88 −0.30 −1.62 −0.22 −0.50 −0.11
Average over consumption-equivalent-variation measures by subgroups, ranked by desirability for the entire population
(‘all’). Parent and kid generations are divided into two productivity groups:  is the productivity below the median and
¯ is productivity above the median. For each group, CEVs are weighted by the ergodic measure over families in the
baseline model. Whenever the CEV for a group is positive (negative), we fin that close to 100% (0%) of the group has
a positive CEV and is thus in favour of the policy measure.
within each group. Support for policies within each group in the table is remarkably uniform:
We fin that whenever the average CEV of a group is positive (negative), close to 100% (0%)
among members of this group have a positive CEV and would thus vote for the policy. The table
can thus be read as a snapshot of the political economy for policies.
The ranking of the policies follows closely the one we fin from the ex-ante CEVs.
Furthermore, both parent and kid generations agree on this ranking. The most preferred policy
option is to offer both subsidies. When considering the effects of the subsidies separately we can
see why. The IC subsidy is especially beneficia to low-productivity () parents but less so for
high-productivity (¯) ones, and vice versa, for the PP subsidy.Whenmaking the same comparison
among children, we see that for the IC subsidy low-productivity kids also have a much larger gain
than high-productivity kids, but the difference in terms of the PPsubsidy isminor, primarily due to
the higher tax rate of this subsidy. Combining both subsidies with a cut to MAyields surprisingly
large gains in welfare despite the unpopularity of cuttingMA.When only shrinkingMA, there are
welfare losses across the board. Unsurprisingly, low-productivity parents are especially hard-hit.
These parents hadmade their savings plans counting on insurance byMedicaid and thus lack self-
insurance through wealth. Informal caregiving does not increase enough to counter this effect;
note that these poor elderly individuals have little to offer in exchange for care. Consumption
drops as agents now have a larger need to self-insure (which is why wealth increases). The
decrease in the payroll tax is insufficien to make up for the losses.
5.5. IC elasticities vis-a-vis the empirical literature
The model predicts fairly large behavioural responses of single disabled individuals to changes
in relative prices of care. A back-of-the-envelope calculation tells us that per 1,000$-increase in
the IC subsidy, there is a reduction of 6.8% in FC.54 The PP subsidy leads to a 1.7% increase in
FC per 1,000$. How large are these responses compared to what we know from empirical work?
Unfortunately, there are no estimates for the U.S. for IC or PP subsidies, simply because such
policies have never been tried in the U.S.
However, there is a number of studies that exploit variation in the generosity of the MA
program, both across time and across U.S. states. The estimates by Cutler and Sheiner (1994),
who exploit cross-state variation, imply that a decrease in the MA reimbursement rate of 10%
54. Formal care (FC = MA + PP) is 55.5% in the baseline calibration, being reduced to 38.9% in sic ↑, a 29.9%
change. Dividing this number by the subsidy amount, 4,375$, one obtains the elasticity, 6.8%.
37
of the average NH cost leads to 11% lower NH use.55 This is close to our counterfactual MA↓,
where a reduction ofMAreimbursement rates by 8.3% (yma/(yma +pbc)) leads to a 10%decline
of FC. Hoerger et al. (1996) fin that lowering MA reimbursement by 10,000$ per patient (in
a lifetime) reduces NH entry by about 15%. This again lines up quite well with our model
prediction, when considering that disabled individuals typically stay in NHs for several years.
Garber and MaCurdy (1993) fin that NH use is quite price-sensitive, studying the NH discharge
hazard at 20 days (when co-payments increase) and at 100 days (at which point Medicare stops
paying). However, other studies fail to fin significan effects of MA rules on NH use, such as
Grabowski and Gruber (2007), who exploit time variation in state MA rules; Norton and Kumar
(2000), exploiting time variation in spousal impoverishment rules; and Reschovsky (1996), who
find no effect of MA income and asset tests on NH entry. We conclude that the elasticity of care
choices from our counterfactuals MA↑ and MA↓ are at the upper end of the empirical estimates.
5.6. Discussion
Are our welfare results robust to features of reality that our model omits?
One concern is that in families withmultiple children, childrenmay interact strategically in the
care decision.56 In our setting, the kid generation makes up one decision unit. We thus implicitly
assume that all children in the family share themarginal caregiver’s opportunity costs of care. This
resource pooling among siblings implies transfers among siblings, but we do not have information
on such transfers in our data. However, the fact that parents favour caregiving children over their
siblings when giving inter-vivos transfers and bequests shows that indeed substantial shifting of
economic resources from non-caregiving to caregiving children takes place within the family.
Thus we see our modelling strategy as a useful firs approximation and leave more careful study
of such interactions in a dynamic setting for future research.
A second concern regards the decision-making process in the family. In reality, parents may
lose their say in the bargaining process when they have dementia and/or become extremely frail.
We argued in Section 2.5 that most disabled persons do not seem to be in this situation; but if
this state is perceived as especially risky, it might influenc previous decisions significantl . Our
current framework is too complex to accommodate more states of disability, which would be
necessary to model a loss of decision-making capabilities with frailty. But we think that doing
so is a promising avenue for future research. Having different levels of severity of disability,
some linked to the loss of decision power, may help to explain that NH use is increasing in the
degree of frailty. This could go both through the bargaining channel and a potential technological
advantage of NHs when it comes to the most severe forms of disability. Also, such a model
may have parents with mild states of dependence spend down wealth more slowly, thus helping
to address the retirement-savings puzzle present in our model. In terms of policy implications,
however, our results should hardly change: the insurance, tax-distortion, and MA channels are
not affected, only the positive effects of IC subsidies that go through the family-commitment
channel would be somewhat weakened.
Third, one may wonder what the omission of an explicit FHC option means for the
interpretation of our results. We argue that qualitatively, subsidies for FHC would act in the
same way as for NHC. In terms of the labour-wedge channel, a FHC subsidy is desirable since
it reduces existing labour-supply distortions, just as a NHC subsidy is. In terms of the insurance,
55. To be precise, they estimate that decreasing the MA reimbursement rate by 4,60$ (which amounts to 10% of
the average NH cost they report) entails a drop in the NH utilization rate of 1.7 percentage points (relative to a mean of
15%).
56. For literature on “gaming” among siblings, we refer the reader to Sovinsky and Stern (2014) and the references
therein.
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TABLE 11
High opportunity cost (low β)
LTC policy IC MA PP τ p25 p50 p75 Short run Long run
New baseline 34.7% 37.0% 28.3% $52K $186K $399K
sic ↑ 47.3 29.0 23.6 0.12 45 174 387 0.33 0.18
skic ↑ 47.5 28.8 23.7 −0.00 48 178 390 0.24 0.15
spp ↑ 15.7 31.7 52.5 0.21 49 170 373 0.14 0.00
both↑ 31.8 24.7 43.5 0.25 41 160 365 0.50 0.22
MA↑ 31.1 42.5 26.4 0.20 41 176 393 0.08 −0.07
MA↓ 37.4 32.0 30.6 −0.18 67 196 404 −0.17 −0.00
MA↓, both↑ 32.8 21.3 45.1 0.15 49 165 368 0.38 0.20
Counterfactual policy experiments starting from a baseline with higher caregiver opportunity cost: lower β from 0.66 to
0.57, leaving all other parameters as under the calibrated baseline. Table 15 in the Online Appendix presents all results
for the various policy experiments in this alternative specification All columns are as define in Table 9.
Medicaid and family-commitment channels, though, the FHC subsidy (just as the NHC subsidy)
should be dominated by the informal-care subsidy, since it is less likely to be taken up by the
poorest families. Assessing the merits of FHC subsidies quantitatively would require a theory of
why some people choose FHC and others NHC; we leave this for further research.
Another potential omission of the model is that informal caregivers may lose human capital in
addition to the contemporaneous opportunity costs of caregiving that we consider in our model.
But this omission is probably not as large of a concern as one may firs think. Heavy-helping
caregivers are 48 years on average, and thus close to the end of their careers, and are also typically
of low education (only 18% have a college degree).An arguably bigger concern is that a caregiver
gives up the match quality of her job (i.e. she may lose a position that fit her skills well and that
is hard to recover after a prolonged absence). Our model implicitly assumes that the IC policy is
accompanied by some form of guarantee to return back to the same job at the same wage, as is the
case in Germany. However, even with such a policy in place, there may be long-run wage losses
to caregivers that our model cannot capture, such as losses in social-security pension benefits A
short-cut to address these issues in our model is to increase the opportunity cost from caregiving
by lowering the gender-earnings gap, which is encoded in the parameter β. This scenario is also
of interest per se in view of two trends: a rising female labour-market participation rate and the
narrowing of the gender-earnings gap.
In Table 11, we consider a scenario in which we lower β from 0.66 to 0.57. This amounts
to a two-third reduction of the gender-earnings gap.57 We maintain all other parameters as in
the baseline calibration. Taking this scenario as the new baseline, we then carry out the same
counterfactuals as for the status quo (using the same changes to the subsidy and MA parameters
as before). Table 11 shows the most important results. The level of IC in the new baseline is
about 10 percentage points lower. The behavioural changes and the welfare effects induced by
the different policies with respect to the new baseline are somewhat muted, but always go in the
same direction as before. Thus, our results are robust.
There are also other trends that will make the situation for governments more challenging
than our model has it: rising divorce rates, fast-rising NH prices, and an increasing dependency
ratio. For example, in present-day China most families have only one child and thus two sets of
elderly parents depend on only one young family. Our model has nothing to say about how such
conflict are resolved. A rigorous treatment of such trends is clearly of interest, but is beyond the
scope of the current article.
57. We defin the gender-earnings gap as β/(1−β)−1, thus it decreases from 100% (baseline) to 33% (low β).
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6. CONCLUSIONS
We propose a dynamic non-cooperative framework for LTC decisions of families and use it to
evaluate LTC policy options for the U.S. A key innovation is the availability of IC, which is
determined through intra-family bargaining. Our article provides three important insights: First,
the family margin matters strongly when it comes to evaluating LTC policies. Second, a non-
means-tested IC subsidy does particularly well in insuring an aging population and in reducing
Medicaid costs, labour supply distortions and the loss to tax revenue being rather small. Third,
old-age health expenditures become less risky with the introduction of a family channel as LTC
can also be produced at home.
We conclude by briefl discussing practical effects of the subsidies considered that go beyond
our modelling framework.
In reality, implementing a non-means-tested formal-care subsidymay pose a challenge: policy
makers have to make the case why financia support should be given even to those who need
it least, for example to wealthy individuals who can easily afford to pay for a private NH.
Another concern with a formal-care subsidy may be that it enables NHs to appropriate some of
the consumer surplus and charge higher prices (that problem, however, may be already present
with Medicaid). But, an increase in NH demand from private agents may plausibly lead to more
competition among formal-care providers. This would help to control the price of care, giving a
rationale for supporting such a subsidy.
Our analysis tells us that an informal-care subsidy is an attractive policy option. However, such
a subsidy requires a disability-certificatio scheme to deter families from untruthfully claiming
disability; this form of moral hazard is less of an issue when the benefi is tied to entry into a
nursing home. There are certainly costs and difficultie of implementing such tests. However, they
are probably not much higher than those associated with the means tests currently in place, which
are also subject to moral hazard. A disability-certificatio scheme may also offer unexpected
benefits It makes it easier for agents to write Arrow-Debreu-style contracts that pay benefit
contingent on disability status and not on NH residency, thus keeping open a larger range of
options to the individual. Such contracts are indeed already available on the German market,
where a public disability-certificatio scheme was put in place when public LTC insurance was
introduced.
APPENDIX
A. THEORYAPPENDIX
A.1. Details on the HJBs and boundary conditions
We defin the diagonal elements of the income hazard matrix as h (i,i)=−∑j 	=i h (i,j) for notational convenience.
The jump terms in the HJB, equation (3), are then
J i(z)=
N ∑
m=1
h (k ,m)V i(·,m,p,jk )
︸ ︷︷ ︸
kid’s productivity risk
+(1−s)δs(z)
[
V i(ak ,ap,1,·)−V i(z)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
LTC risk
(21)
+δd (z)
[
(αp)I{i=p}Z(ak +ap,k ,jk )−V i(z)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
death risk
+δm(z)
∫
V i(ak ,max{ap −M ,0},·)dFm(M )︸ ︷︷ ︸
medical-spending shocks
,
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where I{·} is the indicator function and where Z(ak ,k ,jk ) is the value for the kid generation when parents are dead and
kids have wealth ak , productivity k , and age jk . Z obeys the following HJB, which is standard for consumption-savings
problems:
ρZ(ak ,k ,jk )= Zj(ak ,k ,jk )+max
ck ≥0
{
uk (ck )+[y(k ,jk )+rak −ck]Za(ak ,k ,jk )} (22)
+
N ∑
m=1
h (k ,m)Z(ak ,m,jk ),
where subscripts to Z denote partial derivatives.At age jret , the kid generation splits up into (1+ν) new parent households
and is matched to a new kid with the same productivity and zero wealth. This imposes the following boundary condition:
Z(a,,jret)= (1+ν)V p
(
0,
a
1+ν ,0,,,jret
)
∀a,. (23)
Finally, the fact that parents die with certainty at jdth imposes the boundary conditions
V i(ap,ak ,s,k ,p,jret)= (αp)I{i=p}Z(ak +ap,k ,jret) ∀ap,ak ,s,k ,p, for i∈{k,p}. (24)
A.2. Government: taxation and budget constraint
In all of the following, λ(z) denotes the stationary measure of families over the state space. Kids with dead parents are
included in this measure, making the obvious adjustments. The government’s budget constraint is as follows:∫ [
T p(z)+T k (z,h(z))+νT k (z,0)]dλ(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
tax revenue
(25)
=
∫
s
(
h(z)sic +(1−h(z))
[
(1−m(z))spp +m(z)(pbc +yma)
])
dλ(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
LTC spending on widows
+
∫
(1−s)sm(z)[ιsic +(1−ι)spp]dλ(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
LTC spending on husbands
+
∫
yp(p)np(jp,p,s)dλ(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
SS benefit
+
∫ ∫ [
max{M −ap,0}dFm(M )
]
δm(z)dλ(z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
means-tested benefit covering medical expenditures
+ G︸︷︷︸
other expenditures
.
Tax revenues consist of the sum over parent’s and kid’s tax payments, weighted by the stationary measure λ over families.
Note that the ν infra-marginal kid households never give IC, but for the marginal kid household the IC decisions h(z)
matters. Government spending consists of the following items: (1) LTC subsidies and Medicaid spending for widows in
households with s=1, which depend on the IC and MA decisions, h and m, (2) LTC subsidies to disabled husbands in
households with s=0, (3) spending for households that do not have enough wealth to pay for medical shocks M , and
(4) other government expenditures, G, including social-security benefi payments (since we do not consider changes to
demography in the counterfactuals and the labour-productivity process is exogenous, SS benefi payments are constant
across all scenarios).
A.3. Equilibrium definition
A recursive equilibrium consists of value functions for the kid, V k , the parent, V p, kids with dead parents, Z ; policy
rules for the kids, {gk ,ck }, the parent, {gp,m,cp}, kids without parents, c˜k , an informal-care rule, h, and an informal-care
transfer function, Q∗; prices {w,pbc}; a government policy, {sic,spp}; and a stationary measure λ(z) over families such
that:
(1) Both kid and parent are best-responding to the other, that is the value functions V k and V p satisfy (3)–(12)
taking as given the policy rules by the other player. Also, the maxima in (5)–(7) are attained by the policies
ck ,cp,m,gp,gk .
(2) The value function Z satisfie (22), the maximum being attained by c˜k .
(3) The value functions V p,V k ,W jointly satisfy equations (21)–(24).
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(4) The informal-care decision rule, h, and the transfer rule, Q∗, are the Nash-bargaining solution between kid and
parent, that is they satisfy (10)–(12).
(5) Firms maximize profit given prices, that is Ly and Lf attain the maximum in (13) and (14), respectively.
(6) Markets clear, that is ∫
y(jk ,k )[1+ν−(1−β)h(z)]dλ(z)=Ly +Lf (labour)
G+
∫ [
cp +ck +r(ap +ak )+myma +δm(z)
∫
M dFm(M )
]
dλ(z)=AyLy (consumption good)∫
s
[
1−h(z)]+(1−s)sm(1−ι)dλ(z)=Af Lf (formal care)
(7) The government’s budget is balanced, that is (25) holds.
(8) λ is the ergodic density over families given the law of motion induced by optimal decisions.
In the game between parents and kids, we restrict attention to the equilibrium that arises as the limit of a finit dynasty. A
finite dynasty is one in which there exists a fina parent generation that has no kids but faces otherwise the same physical
environment as the other generations.
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